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Abstract 
 
Objective 
Variability in how clinicians diagnose PTSD has been studied across treatment 
settings. Research shows several factors impact diagnostic variability. The purpose of this 
study was to evaluate the extent to which disclosure of military service leads to an 
increase in diagnosis of PTSD when considering an otherwise vague symptom profile. 
We hypothesize veteran status will increase the likelihood of a PTSD diagnosis than 
status as a teacher. 
 
Methods 
Clinician were recruited online through professional message boards and listservs. 
Participants were randomly assigned a vignette (veteran or teacher status) and 
subsequently asked to make diagnostic judgments. Two vignettes, identical with the 
exception of veteran or teacher status, were employed to represent a vague symptom 
profile, unremarkable for any clear diagnostic symptoms. In order to evaluate for the 
specific impact of disclosure of military service, the vignettes excluded any discussion of 
trauma or stressors and included vague symptoms common to any number of affective 
disorders. 
 
Results 
A total of 366 clinicians participated in the study. Clinicians assigned to the 
Veteran vignette were 6-times more likely to diagnose the client with PTSD (Std. 
Residuals 4.1) than would be expected by chance. 
  
Conclusion and Implications 
Client characteristic of “Veteran” impacted the clinicians’ diagnostic decision. 
The findings from this study support a strong relationship between individuals’ veteran 
status and the initial diagnostic inference a clinician will make, specifically PTSD. 
Exploratory analysis of licensure status and DSM training suggested these variables had a 
moderating effect on diagnostic selection. There are several implications. The absence of 
a criterion A stressor is potentially undervalued for veteran clients. Results suggest more 
research is needed to understand clinician factors influencing diagnostic decision-making. 
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Chapter 1: Background and Significance 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a mental health diagnosis rooted in 
continuous controversy since its first inclusion in the DSM-III published in 1980 (Marx, 
2009).  Initial controversy stemmed from the conventional wisdom at the time, which 
held that battlefield stress diminished once a person was no longer in combat. Tying a 
diagnosis to a specific historical event was unprecedented and only gained support once it 
was clear the diagnosis also applied to varied traumatic stressors including natural 
disaster, sexual assault, and interpersonal violence (McNally, 2003).  Thirty-five years 
later, it is hardly a novel assumption that traumatic experiences can create symptoms of 
psychiatric distress, yet the diagnosis of PTSD continues to reflect varied and, at times, 
conflicting beliefs and attitudes about trauma and trauma-response (Rosen & Frueh, 
2007).   
Variability in how clinicians diagnose PTSD has been studied across treatment 
settings. Research has focused on the utilization of evidence-based assessment tools, as 
well as variability in how widely the construct of PTSD might be stretched by clinicians. 
There is not enough research to identify what non-clinical factors lead to an increase in 
the PTSD diagnosis. Understanding the drivers of clinical decision-making while serving 
veterans can help ensure accurate diagnosis and appropriate treatment. The purpose of 
this study is to evaluate the extent to which non-clinical considerations influence a PTSD 
diagnosis. More specifically, when presented with a clinically vague case report with no 
mention of a traumatic event, are clinicians exposed to a person with a history of military 
service more likely to render a PTSD diagnosis than clinicians exposed to the identical 
clinical profile with no noted inclusion of military service history? Second, what are the 
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potential moderating effects of specific provider characteristics, such as demographic 
data or time in practice, on the diagnostic conclusions reached? 
In order to convey the significance of our findings, we review seminal literature 
on PTSD and clinical decision making. We present the literature on key historical 
changes the diagnostic construct of PTSD has undergone, epidemiological data on PTSD 
in the military, and central debates in research literature which have informed the 
revisions of the DSM PTSD criteria. We review available literature on practice variability 
in the diagnosis of PTSD. Beyond PTSD, we review seminal literature on clinical 
decision making and heuristics. The intention of this literature review is to provide a 
cogent framework for understanding provider decision-making and the potential impact 
of non-clinical data on the diagnosis of PTSD. 
What is PTSD? 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual underwent significant revision in 2013, 
making significant changes to the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. Subsequent to these 
changes, PTSD is no longer categorized as an anxiety disorder but has been reclassified 
as a trauma- and stressor- related disorder. Significant revisions went into the DSM-5 
classification of PTSD, and in a paper describing the process for developing the updated 
guidelines, Friedman acknowledges the complex debates which occurred within the APA 
working group:  
The Stressor A1 criterion has always been one of the most challenging 
aspects of the PTSD diagnosis. Although it has always been easy to get 
agreement that events such as rape, torture, combat, and brutal assault are 
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traumatic, such consensus is harder to sustain when the sudden death of a 
loved one is also considered traumatic, as in the DSM‐IV. Furthermore, it 
has always been understood that whereas exposure to an A1 event is a 
necessary condition for the development of PTSD, it is clearly not a 
sufficient condition since most A1-exposed individuals do not develop the 
disorder (Friedman, 2013). 
In order to achieve a diagnosis of PTSD, an individual must express unique 
symptoms from each of the following five criteria: 
Criterion A: exposure to a traumatic stressor.  
The DSM-5 defines traumatic exposure as something one must experience 
directly or witness as it occurs to others and the exposure itself must be “actual or 
threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence, in the following way(s):  
• Direct exposure 
• Witnessing the trauma 
• Learning that a relative or close friend was exposed to a trauma 
• Indirect exposure to aversive details of the trauma, usually in the course of 
professional duties (e.g., first responders, medics), (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013, p. 271). 
National experts in PTSD evaluated and debated the diagnostic construct against 
the best available research and philosophical assumptions of what should guide treatment 
and cogent nosological description. The traumatic event exposure, or Criterion A, stands 
out as the most controversial debate in papers describing changes to the DSM (Brewin, 
Lanius, Novac, Schnyder, & Galea, 2009; Friedman, 2013). Early controversy around the 
Crystal Shelton 
6 
 
traumatic stressor criteria published in the earlier DSM-IV released in 1994, centered 
around the language in Criteria A being overly confining. Additional debate between 
researchers pointed to the paradox that some people might experience a significant 
stressor and have any number of non-PTSD responses, while others noted that many 
people did not need to be exposed to a stressor as defined by the DSM-IV in order to 
exhibit hallmark symptoms of the disorder (Breslau & Alvarado, 2007; Rosen, Spitzer, & 
McHugh, 2008). General disagreement as to the threshold of a “traumatic” event, versus 
a non-traumatic but stressful event, informed the discussion and decisions around the 
DSM-5 revisions (Friedman, 2013). Prior to the development of the DSM-5 updated 
standards, prominent researchers argued for doing away with the Criterion A exposure 
altogether (Brewin, Lanius, Novac, Schnyder, & Galea, 2009).  
The Criterion A was deemed essential and core to the construct of PTSD, but 
between the DSM-IV and the DSM-5, there was an essential change: the elimination of 
the requirement that following the exposure to a Criterion A event, a specific reaction 
must have included an intense emotional response, specifically “fear, helplessness, or 
horror” (APA, 2000, p. 467). Between the publication of the DSM-IV and the DSM-5, 
significant evidence has emerged that many people may, by virtue of training or 
circumstance, not react immediately to a traumatic event in any specific way and still 
develop full PTSD symptomology overtime (Friedman, Resick, Resick, Bryant, & 
Brewin, 2011). This finding and decision is specifically relevant to individuals who are 
routinely exposed to traumatic events and trained to specifically work in highly stressful 
and potentially traumatic circumstances, such as law enforcement and military. 
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Criterion B: symptoms of intrusion and re-experiencing.  
PTSD is defined, in part, by involuntary intrusive recollections of a traumatic 
experience, which can present as dreams, dissociative reactions, or intrusive thoughts and 
flashbacks. There are few changes between DSM-IV and DSM-5 in this criterion. One 
specific effort was made to distinguish between the more ruminative thought processes 
common to depression and the “here-and-now images and sensory memories” more 
specific to PTSD (Friedman, et al., 2011, p. 551). 
Criterion C: persistent avoidance.  
The avoidance criterion is met by persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with 
traumatic events and can include memories, places, people, objects and activities. Though 
avoidance symptoms have not changed between editions of the DSM, mood and numbing 
symptoms have been separated out from avoidance and are no longer captured by the 
avoidance criterion. The symptom description has not changed. 
Criterion D: negative alterations in cognitions and mood.  
This criterion, new to the DSM-5, is a reformulation of the numbing symptoms 
described in the DSM-IV and influenced by cognitive theories (Friedman, 2013). In order 
to meet this criterion, an individual must experience at least two negative cognition and 
mood symptoms, including impaired memory of the traumatic event, negative beliefs and 
world-view, distorted beliefs about oneself and the trauma or an overall negative 
emotional state including depressed or angry mood, the inability to experience joy, or 
detachment or estrangement. 
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Criterion E: hypervigilence or hyperarousal.  
Individuals with PTSD will exhibit a heightened sensitivity to perceived risks and 
distorted risk perception. This can result in an exaggerated startle reaction, the inability to 
remain calm in public spaces, or a persistent feeling of being “on guard.” Between the 
DSM-IV and DSM-5, the criterion has broadened to include behavioral reactivity, based 
on several studies identifying externalizing behaviors as an expression of reactivity 
(Friedman, et al., 2011; Kilpatrick, et al., 2003).  
In spite of the utility of standardized screening and assessment for PTSD, the 
diagnosis remains dependent on the clinical judgment of an individual clinical observer.  
Validated, objective assessment measures are underutilized, and providers bring unique 
beliefs and variation into the assessment process (Jackson, et al., 2011). Variability in 
how mental health and medical providers diagnose PTSD has been studied across 
treatment settings. A number of factors have been evaluated as having impact on 
diagnostic variability. Studies have identified myriad factors, such as provider beliefs and 
biases, as well as deficiencies in the diagnostic construct as impacting diagnostic 
variability (Gravely et al., 2011; Jackson et al., 2011; McDonald & Calhoun, 2010; 
Schillaci et al., 2009).  Relative to other mental health diagnoses, PTSD may be 
particularly vulnerable to variation in diagnostic practices, especially in light of the  many 
changes the diagnostic criteria have undergone since the original inclusion in the DSM-
III (Spitzer, Rosen, & Lilienfeld, 2008; Rosen, Frueh, Lilienfeld, McHugh, & Spitzer, 
2012). There is some evidence to suggest clients’ revelations of non-symptom data, such 
as social background or history of trauma,  early in the course of treatment during clinical 
assessment, might have the impact of predisposing, or anchoring, a clinician towards a 
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PTSD diagnosis even in the absence of other PTSD symptoms (Friedlander & Stockman, 
1983; Woodward, Taft, Gordon, & Meis, 2009).  
Since 9/11, PTSD has been publicly and repeatedly correlated with the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, having been described routinely as the signature injury of the 
years-long conflicts (Bodkin, Pope, Detke, & Hudson, 2007b; Litz, 2007; McNally, 2003; 
McNally & Frueh, 2013; Rosen & Lilienfeld, 2008). PTSD has become a part of the 
national dialogue when discussing our veterans’ mental health needs and experiences. 
Though PTSD is not an injury unique to military service members and veterans, 
subsequent to OEF/OIF, the significant majority of funding granted toward developing 
novel treatments for PTSD has been specific to veterans, or within the Veterans 
Administration or Department of Defense (Galea et al., 2012).  
Exposure to potentially traumatic events across service branches is difficult to 
measure. Current prevalence rates have been described for specific combat-deployed 
units, and the exposure rates are unsurprisingly high. According to a 2011 study, up to 
75% of service members deployed in support of OEF and OIF reported exposure to 
incoming artillery and mortar fire, 50% reported seeing dead bodies, and between 15% 
and 25% reported discharging their own weapon in combat (Ramchand, Schell, Jaycox, 
& Tanielian, 2011). With these numbers, it would not be surprising if clinicians assumed 
an equally high, or parallel prevalence of the development of PTSD symptoms. But 
current epidemiological surveys are largely limited to deployment data and post-
deployment surveys. While these studies are vital for understanding and preparing to treat 
the wounds of war, they also have the potential to yield the impression that all service 
members are exposed to the same levels of traumatic events. Outside of deployment, 
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exposure to trauma is not a standard part of military service. Because PTSD is so 
frequently discussed and studied in the context of the military service, it is possible that 
military service itself is becoming nosologically linked with PTSD for clinicians, 
particularly those with less familiarity with military day-to-day experiences. 
Additionally, PTSD prevalence estimates vary, but most national military 
estimates range between 12% and 21% (Hoge et al., 2014; Holdeman, 2009; Kilpatrick et 
al., 2013; Ramchand et al., 2010; Richardson, Frueh, & Acierno, 2010; Tanielian, 2009). 
While this rate is non-trivial, it illustrates the significant majority of service members do 
not report symptoms consistent with PTSD. Even with high rates of exposure to 
potentially traumatic events during deployments, fewer than 25% of service members 
will report subsequent symptoms consistent with PTSD. Because of the variability of 
exposure to traumatic events and even more variability in subsequent symptom 
development, military service does not directly correlate to traumatic exposure or PTSD.  
Issues in the Assessment and Treatment of PTSD 
Significant attempts to improve access to effective care for PTSD in veterans have 
led to a body of research evaluating some of the core challenges in diagnosing and 
treating the disorder. In studies specifically evaluating the efficacy of current diagnostic 
practices around PTSD, simple diagnostic variability and lack of utilization of validated 
or standard assessment measures emerges as a central issue (Gravely et al., 2011; Jackson 
et al., 2011). Though there is strong empirical evidence that there is variation and 
variability in how PTSD is diagnosed and assessed, the extent to which diagnostic 
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variability impacts access to services, treatment resources, individuals and health-systems 
is not fully understood. 
At the broadest level, one of the most obvious impacts of variability in diagnostic 
practices and tools is the difficulty in establishing consistent prevalence rates when 
looking at military populations (Ramchand, et al., 2010). At a more local level, diagnostic 
variability has been looked at within VA and other healthcare systems, and there are two 
primary, and conflicting findings: PTSD in veterans is over-diagnosed resulting in the 
pathologizing of a normal and adaptive response, overloading an already burdened care 
system and confounding efforts at developing effective treatments (Gravely et al., 2011; 
McNally & Freuh 2012). Conversely, many researchers argue PTSD in veterans is under-
diagnosed as a function of inadequate access to appropriate screening, ongoing stigma 
which limits disclosure of symptoms, and ineffective differentiation by underprepared 
clinicians to differentiate between other psychiatric disorders and PTSD (Keane, Taylor, 
& Penk, 1997; Magruder & Yeager, 2008; Marx et al., 2012; Schillaci et al., 2009). There 
is also ongoing debate over what makes for a normal human response versus a 
pathological response when confronted with significantly stressful events (Bodkin et al., 
2007b; Bonanno, 2004; Litz, 2005). The argument over how PTSD is conceptualized, 
defined, and utilized is not simply an academic problem impacting research findings and 
population health data, but an issue of diagnosis and subsequently providing appropriate 
treatment. Following the failure to attend to the psychological wounds of our Vietnam 
and Korean War veterans, military and veteran’s treatment centers now routinely screen 
for PTSD in any service member or veteran who has been deployed.  In these settings 
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there is profound variability in how clinicians integrate standardized screening measures 
and ultimately diagnose PTSD (Gravely et al., 2011; Jackson et al., 2011). 
At best, the research discrepancies can be frustrating for front-line clinicians, 
patients, policy makers and clinical educators seeking to ensure timely and effective 
treatment. From the papers of those who argue for more proactive screening and 
diagnosis, there are medical and moral reasons given for prompt screening and diagnosis 
of PTSD. Medically, the most disabling symptoms of PTSD are considered highly 
treatable with early intervention (Lobbrecht, Wicherts, Morina, & Priebe, 2014; 
Richardson, Rumbaugh Jr, & Zembrzuska, 2015). Morally, the sacrifices of our veterans 
result in a social responsibility to attend to their emotional and mental wounds 
engendered in national defense (Kolk & Najavits, 2013).   There are consequences to 
both over-diagnosing and under-diagnosing the disorder.  These risks include creating 
issues with access to care, failure to offer disorder-appropriate treatment, and over-
pathologizing a normal adaptive response. 
For those who are critical of the diagnosis and the manner in which it is applied 
there are a couple of key themes. First, the rate of veterans seeking compensation for 
PTSD is growing at a rate considered to be disproportionate to the actual development of 
PTSD (McNally & Frueh, 2013). Second, PTSD as a diagnostic construct has been 
exposed to considerable scrutiny since it was first proposed for inclusion in the DSM-III 
in 1980 and through subsequent revisions the scrutiny has not lessened (Bodkin, Pope, 
Detke, & Hudson, 2007a; Breslau & Alvarado, 2007; Litz, 2003; McNally, 2003; Rosen 
et al., 2008; Rosen, Lilienfeld, Frueh, McHugh, & Spitzer, 2010). Of all the diagnoses 
present in the multiple editions of the DSM, PTSD has undergone, by far, the most 
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significant changes from edition to edition (Spitzer, First, & Wakefield, 2007). Between 
the DSM-III and DSM-IV, PTSD was altered so that the traumatic experience criteria no 
longer required the direct experience of a specific event but could be met by secondary, 
or vicarious, trauma (McNally, 2003; Spitzer et al., 2007). This led to what some 
researchers and clinicians claimed was conceptual bracket creep, and researchers 
frequently noted other disorders are likely being encapsulated by a PTSD diagnosis, due 
to issues with the vagueness of its criteria (Bodkin et al., 2007b; McNally, 2003; Rosen & 
Lilienfeld, 2008). In spite of broadening the criteria around trauma exposure (criterion 
A), the DSM-V continues to draw very specific parameters around qualifying events. 
Those critical of adjustments to the criteria around trauma exposure have said that it 
“tie(s) clinicians’ hands” and removes previously qualifying events, such as the death of a 
child from prolonged illness or the remote death of an esteemed battlefield commander, 
from consideration as a criterion A stressor (Hoge et al., 2016).  
In spite of the ongoing controversy, it would seem all parties agree that there is a 
lot at stake for a vulnerable population. How we understand and classify the emotional 
and mental health injuries incurred in combat translates into how we develop and deliver 
effective treatments. If screening, diagnosis, and treatment options are to be improved for 
our veterans, we must account for potential hindrances to delivering that care.  
Conceptual Challenges with PTSD as a Diagnostic Construct 
Rosen and Lilienfeld (2008) open their evaluation criticism of the core 
assumptions of PTSD with an acknowledgement of the controversy surrounding the 
diagnosis.  Citing Spitzer, First, and Wakefield (2007) they note: “Since its introduction 
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into the DSM-III in 1980, no other DSM diagnosis…has generated so much controversy 
in the field as to the boundaries of the disorder, diagnostic criteria, central assumptions, 
clinical utility, and prevalence in various populations” (as cited by Rosen & Lilienfeld, 
2008, p. 838).  Rosen and Lilienfeld (2008) evaluate the construct validity of PTSD and 
whether it possesses “substantial incremental validity for predicting clinically important 
external validating criteria, above and beyond extant and better validated diagnoses (e.g., 
specific phobia, generalized anxiety disorder, depression)” (p. 838).  
Rosen and Lilienfeld’s (2008) critique specifically identifies significant problems 
in the current research about the criterion A (experience or exposure to trauma) 
relationship to clinically significant distress. They note a wide body of mental health and 
epidemiology research that finds the fulfillment of PTSD symptom criteria absent any 
traumatic stressor—instead following natural life stressors of friendship difficulties, 
marital distress, bereavement, and frightening television programs (p. 839). The question 
underlying their critique, then, is whether clinicians/researchers are ‘looking’ for 
something specifically different than normal human responses to normal human stressors 
when evaluating for PTSD? Further supporting the idea that PTSD is a category that 
might be too broadly applied, they cite a study by Bodkin, Pope, Detke, and Hudson 
(2007) who found that individuals presenting for treatment of depression or anxiety, but 
not PTSD and with no endorsement of a trauma history, were diagnosed with PTSD—at 
a rate of 78%—by noting they were able to recall a distressing time (in place of a 
traumatic stressor) when responding to assessment questions from a Structured Clinical 
Interview (SCID).  
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Conversely, it is entirely possible (indeed, likely) to experience trauma and not 
develop PTSD symptomology. In traditional dose-response models the clinical response 
would be, in some way, equivalent to the magnitude of the stressor. This does not appear 
to be the case with PTSD. Rosen and Lilienfeld (2008) cite no fewer than 15 reviews, 
structural equation modeling studies, psychological research studies and meta-analyses 
that find “(a) most individuals do not develop PTSD after Criterion A events, (b) simple 
dose-response relationship is often not supported, and (c) factors extraneous to the event 
contribute more variance to clinical outcome than the event itself” (p. 840). The ideas that 
traumatic events have little predictive value in assessing symptoms and symptoms of 
PTSD are not considered unique to trauma-response pose serious challenges to the 
validity of the PTSD diagnostic construct according to Rosen and Lilienfeld (2008).  
The concern over construct validity might have front line clinicians scratching 
their heads, as they routinely see psychiatric distress associated directly with traumatic 
events. But if we are to commit to providing the best possible treatment, as measured by 
consistent reduction in symptom distress, then it is incumbent on providers to regard 
studies like Rosen and Lilienfeld (2008) as challenges to reduce vagaries and variation in 
diagnosis and resulting treatment. One of the most significant challenges noted by Rosen 
and Lilienfeld (2008) is posed by comorbidity and symptom overlap. Comorbidity in and 
of itself does not pose a challenge to the distinctness of PTSD as a diagnosis, but “the 
problem is that many of the symptom criteria that define PTSD also serve to define the 
very disorders with which PTSD most frequently occurs,” (p. 845).  
In a 1997 paper Keane, Taylor and Penk reported on their study specifically 
intended to measure if PTSD can be diagnostically distinguished between other 
Crystal Shelton 
16 
 
frequently co-occurring psychiatric disorders, particularly major depressive disorder 
(MDD) and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Utilizing an instrument which included 
80 specific line-item symptoms and associated features relating to PTSD, MDD and 
GAD, they assessed 340 clinicians experienced in diagnosing PTSD with their ability to 
sort and rate individual symptoms into distinct diagnostic categories. They noted that 
their study was able to answer, “Can clinicians differentiate PTSD from GAD and 
MDD?” by analyzing the degree of difference in scoring by clinicians who each rated the 
same 90 symptoms (p. 320).  Multivariate and univariate analysis of variance provided 
strong support for the idea that PTSD is readily differentiated from MDD and GAD along 
symptom clusters as well as associated features.  The authors also acknowledged certain 
limitations of the study. While their findings support the idea that experienced clinicians 
are able to respond to nominal prompts, they were not asked to rate actual patients who 
present with vague and overlapping symptoms. This means, for the purpose of their 
study, clinicians were reporting on their memory of “prototypical” patients (p. 326).  
Diagnostic Accuracy and Clinical Judgment 
One can begin to understand the importance of clinical consistency in assessing 
and treating PTSD when reviewing literature related to the clinical practice guidelines for 
PTSD. Benzodiazepines, largely considered effective in treating GAD and specific 
phobias, has been shown to be ineffective in treating PTSD (Guina, Rossetter, DeRhodes, 
Nahhas, & Welton, 2015; Lund, Abrams, Bernardy, Alexander, & Friedman, 2014; 
Mohamed & Rosenheck, 2008a; Mohamed & Rosenheck, 2008b; Rosen et al., 2013). 
Nonetheless, long after this was identified, benzodiazepines continued to be a routine 
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treatment. In 2013, researchers conducted a cross-sectional analysis of national Veterans 
Health Agency (VHA) psychopharmacological data from 2009. They reviewed the 
records of 356,958 veterans with active diagnoses of PTSD who were receiving 
medication from VHA prescribing providers. In spite of widely circulating guidelines 
noting the detrimental impact of benzodiazepines as a pharmacological agent for the 
treatment of PTSD, 37.0% of patients had received a benzodiazepine prescription in the 
last year. This was not simply an issue of quick prescribing in primary care given 68.8% 
of these prescriptions were written by mental health clinicians.  
There are limits to what can be inferred by extant data. Little is known about the 
mechanisms responsible for the wide variety of diagnosing and prescribing practices of 
clinicians working with PTSD. Little is known about the clinical judgment that leads a 
clinician to formulate a treatment plan or diagnosis in or out of accordance with best 
practice standards. In an attempt to make diagnosis and the pipeline to treatment 
straightforward, the VA system (responsible for the vast majority of military-related 
PTSD care) theoretically utilizes standardized screening, interviews, and multimodal 
testing as a routine measure. However, in a study reviewing clinical variability in PTSD 
diagnosis by mental health providers, fewer than 15% of 138 surveyed clinicians reported 
ever using a standardized interview, less than 1% reported using functional assessment 
scales, and fewer than 59% reported relying on any testing (Jackson et al., 2011). Clinical 
diagnosis should be formed by clinical information, specifically symptom reports and 
biomedical data (Trechak, 1999). There is data to suggest that clinical judgment is 
influenced by a variety of non-clinical factors.  
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The DSM was developed on the assumption that psychiatric disorders should be 
orderly, recognizable, and classified as objectively as possible and assessed standardly 
irrespective of theoretical orientation. Though psychiatric disorders have always been 
classified with a specific nosology, the classifications and characterizations of early 
psychological constructs were highly subjective (Shorter, 2013).  Classical psychological 
theories intentionally drew from the affective experience of the observer/expert to inform 
conclusions about the subject (Garb, 1994; Kim & Ahn, 2002). Objectivity was not a 
central construct in early psychological theory. But over the last several decades, the 
subjective analysis of the observer has become largely subordinate to more rigorous 
conventions within both clinical research and practice. Even within qualitative research, 
there is a strong movement to improve interrater reliability (Armstrong, Gosling, 
Weinman, & Marteau, 1997; Glaser, 2017). The current classification system for 
psychiatric diagnoses does not explicitly place any primacy on the subjective 
interpretation of the observer/expert. Disorders are standardized and explicitly defined to 
a degree that limits, in as much as is possible, subjectivity.  
Even as we move towards highly empirical and standardized models of 
assessment and treatment, clinicians, not computers, are responsible for diagnosing and 
treating the overwhelming majority of psychological injuries and illnesses. It isn’t 
necessarily reasonable or desirable for clinicians to completely suspend their internal 
judgments in favor of rigid algorithms. However, improving accuracy and validity within 
diagnosis and assessment requires limiting subjective interference. Structured Clinical 
Interviews routinely are shown to yield more accurate and valid diagnosis than 
unstructured and interpretive clinical assessments (Basco et al., 2000; Miller, Dasher, 
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Collins, Griffiths, & Brown, 2001). Psychology and social science are, by definition, a 
human enterprise, therefore, understanding what drives clinical judgment is important to 
improving healthcare quality ( Hajjaj, Salek, Basra, & Finlay, 2010; Nelson, Stith, & 
Smedley, 2002; Spoont et al., 2014). At the broadest level, understanding what factors 
influence clinical judgment and decision-making can help to inform clinical training and 
service delivery frameworks that can improve quality healthcare and research for 
everyone.   
Clinical judgment research is broad and crosses all medical and clinical 
disciplines. The broadest body of research into clinical judgment has been conducted in 
the field of family medicine and general medical practice (Blumenthal-Barby & Krieger, 
2015). Blumenthal-Barby and Krieger (2015) identified 5606 studies that evaluated 
biases and heuristics across client and clinician populations. Because cognitive processes 
typically occur without notice or observation, many of the factors that impact clinical 
judgment are subtle and not easily observed (Garb, 2005; Kihlstrom, 1990). Some 
clinical judgment research has focused on identifying the hazards of specific factors such 
as biases, socioeconomic and racial beliefs, stereotyped beliefs about prototype-patients 
and non-clinical contextual factors. Other research has identified positive aspects of 
cognitive short-cuts, or heuristics.  
Heuristics 
A heuristic, in general, is a concept that refers to a decisional process wherein an 
individual will assimilate certain information, or limited data points, into a broader 
contextual meaning, allowing for “short cuts” in thinking (Garb, 2005). Cognitive 
heuristics, formulated by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), have been applied to describe 
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how clinicians think. Biases and heuristics are frequently used interchangeably but they 
are not identical concepts. Heuristics, broadly stated, refer to the cognitive processes at 
play when making judgments under uncertainty (Blumenthal-Barby & Krieger, 2015; 
Dumont, 1993; Elstein, 1999; Garb, 2005). In the context of clinical decision-making and 
judgment, clinicians are, almost always, working from imperfect and incomplete 
information.  A patient presenting for psychological assessment is unlikely to relate their 
problems, symptoms, stressors, and social context in a complete and cogent way. Instead, 
there are a number of influences that impact how someone might recall or present their 
information to a clinician during an assessment (Arkes, 1981; Bloom & Bloom, 1963; 
Dumont, 1993). For example, based on mood or events of the day, an individual can be 
expected to assign weight to perceived vulnerabilities differently on one day than another 
(Blumenthal-Barby & Krieger, 2015; Harding, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The 
clinician’s task is to assimilate the incomplete information into a cogent assessment. The 
process by which a clinician fills in the gaps and makes inferential judgments is driven by 
heuristic strategies.  
The heuristic strategies an individual might employ are driven by myriad factors. 
A clinician’s theoretical orientation has significant influence on how s/he forms 
judgment. Theoretical frameworks exist to create context for how clinicians view a 
client’s presenting problems and, by extension, make inferential leaps in the absence of 
information. Clinicians trained in specific schools or adherent to a specific clinical school 
of thought can be expected to filter facts and develop inferential conclusions through the 
lens of their specific orientation. Therefore psychoanalytic, Rogerian, or cognitive 
therapists are likely employ to heuristic strategies specific to their orientation, but 
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somewhat similar to those within their own school when assessing a client (Bandura, 
1969; Dumont, 1993). Heuristics are, in many ways, helpful in consolidating vast 
amounts of information in a way that allows for ready formation of causal theories. But 
there are risks, too. Blumenthal-Barby and Krieger (2014) suggest that reliance on 
heuristic strategies may ultimately lead to the development of “cognitive biases, i.e., 
systematic and predictable errors in judgment” (p. 539).  Additionally, initial clinical 
judgments appear to be stubborn and resistant to change, even in the context of new 
presenting information (Dumont, 1993). 
Several heuristic strategies, unrelated to a specific theoretical orientation have 
been described as having universal impact on clinical practice. These are described 
below. 
Affect heuristic  
Introduced by Slovic et al (2002), the affect heuristic describes one’s affective 
responses to information, an instantaneous process linking emotions to one’s beliefs. The 
authors outline a theory, drawn from cognitive neuroscience and literature on 
psychological somatization, that when an individual experiences a stimulus, there is an 
immediate categorizing of the stimulus based on their own affective response which 
informs their future judgment about the stimulus. They note “affective responses occur 
rapidly and automatically—note how quickly you associated with the stimulus words 
treasure or hate. We argue that reliance on such feelings can be characterized as the affect 
heuristic” (p. 1335).  Drivers of affective response are not necessarily positive or negative 
experiences in an individual’s history. Indeed, it has been identified that repeated 
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exposure to a stimulus is enough to create positive preference and positive affect towards 
stimuli (Bornstein, 1989; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007; Zajonc, 1968).  
The affect heuristic was not framed specifically around clinical judgment. Slovic 
et al., (2007) drew largely from social and cognitive psychology to explain how affective 
response drives general judgment. It was Garb (2005) and Dumont (1993) who linked the 
impact of an affect heuristic to clinical judgment. Garb described the impact of the affect 
heuristic as significant, and succinctly noted that how a clinician feels about a stimulus 
has a major impact on their clinical judgment. The direct implication is that clinical 
judgment isn’t formed solely by the input and processing of clinical information. An 
additional component to clinical judgment is driven by a clinician’s affective response to 
clinical and non-clinical data presented by the client. Because clients receiving clinical 
assessment come from a broad array of backgrounds and present under various 
circumstances, there are myriad factors to which a clinician responds. A client’s 
socioeconomic background, style of dress, profession, or personal history might evoke a 
subtle and unobserved affective response. If this response is positive, the clinical 
judgment might then align with the ascribing or assessing of positive qualities. For 
example, beliefs that a client demonstrates resilience, sympathy, and worthiness might be 
evoked by a general affective response. Conversely, if the affective response a clinician 
experiences is negative, there is risk of assigning more negative clinical assumptions, for 
example, when a client is assessed as attention-seeking, non-resilient, and problem-
causing (Garb, 1994; Garb, 2005). 
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Representativeness heuristic  
Representativeness is described in the earliest literature on heuristics as the 
“major heuristic for making causal judgment” (Dumont, 1993, p.198). Something is 
representative if it has a similar antecedent, and the two phenomena become cognitively 
linked for an individual. Representativeness is established through probabilistic 
reasoning, that is, “what is the probability that object A belongs in class B? What is the 
probability that event A originates from process B? What is the probability that process B 
will generate event A?” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 109). If we have a neighbor who 
demonstrates helpfulness, keeps their property tidy, and is generally reliable, what is the 
probability that they are responsible for neighborhood graffiti? If a client experiences 
violence perpetrated by a group of adolescents, future groups of adolescents may become 
representative of that threat. The significance of the representativeness heuristic is that it 
becomes a part of one’s formal thought structure, such that disconfirming evidence, i.e., 
repeated exposure to groups of non-violent adolescents, are filtered out and not integrated 
into one’s broader perspective (Dumont, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
Conversely, clinicians apply instantaneous probabilistic reasoning to client data, 
making cause and effect inferences with limited and incomplete data. Without knowing a 
comprehensive history, it is common for a clinician to make inferential leaps that 
contemporary concerns are grounded in early life events for clients. Because time with 
clients is frequently limited, this can be an important process for expediting meaningful 
case-formulations and treatment plans.  
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Availability heuristic  
One of the fundamental challenges with clinical assessment is the relative paucity 
of relevant data. Frequently clients do not recall or ascribe minimal value to important 
life events. The data, however complete, is not translated directly into a case 
conceptualization.  Instead, salient clinical information is reduced, or filtered, by the 
clinician based on a number of factors, rendering a select amount of information available 
for case formulation. A number of clinician-driven factors have been found to reduce the 
available data used in clinical case conceptualization: biased beliefs about what is 
relevant, theoretical orientation, clinicians’ personal histories, and potentially even the 
time of day (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). The information that is presented to a clinician is 
filtered through “screens of beliefs, theories, behavioral principles, and personal 
schemata” (Dumont, 1993, p. 198). 
Individuals do not recall information presented to them with crystalline memory. 
Anything one learns or hears is processed through one’s own recollective process. The 
information presented during an assessment, and over the course of therapy is recalled 
and utilized according to clinician memory, client emphasis, and the extent to which it is 
ascribed value by both clinician and client. Studies conducted to learn how individuals 
process information have identified broad subjectivity in how they/a person assign(s) 
value to the information presented to them/him/her in a variety of contexts. There is risk, 
then, that the way information is presented in a clinical interview may affect how that 
information is weighted and valued by the clinician. In addition, the subsequent way in 
which the clinician recalls that information can be based on a number of subjective 
criteria that may or may not reflect the client’s broader reality. Social psychologists have 
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set up experiments on how an individual’s mood impacts an individual’s recollection and 
processing of information. Individuals in a negative mood may be more likely to interpret 
and process information in a negative manner (Bower, 1981; Isen, 1984). The availability 
heuristic describes the automatic filtering and recollection of clinical data, leaving only 
what passes through the filter available for clinical assessment. Several writers have 
pointed out that the information that most commonly makes it through the filter and is 
utilized is the most dramatic and vivid information, which may routinely eclipse the more 
mundane, but potentially equally important information (Dumont, 1993; Isen, 1984; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
For an example of the potential risks associated with the availability heuristic, 
consider a clinical assessment wherein a client reveals a recent traumatic event. Because 
the trauma is a vivid and relatable data point in the assessment, issues like chronic poor 
self-esteem, ongoing personal stress within a relationship, and a history of benevolent 
neglect by a parent may be easily overlooked. Consequently, the trauma may be the 
central focus of an assessment and subsequent intervention. It is a vivid and dramatic cue 
that limits the extent to which other salient issues are recollected in the therapeutic 
engagement. 
Bias 
The differentiation between heuristics and biases is not always discrete. Some of 
the seminal literature on heuristics refers to cognitive biases and heuristics almost 
interchangeably and without differentiation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  One 
researcher noted that decisional shortcuts in medicine are referred to as heuristics, until 
they fail, at which point they are then called “cognitive errors,” (Croskerry, 2002). That 
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said, most heuristic studies and theoretical papers are somewhat agnostic, overall, on the 
negative aspects of heuristics. They are frequently described as the necessary cognitive 
processes which allow clinicians to make rapid sense of incomplete information. It may 
be that some biases are not harmful or impacting. But there are several biases that have 
been researched and found to have significant negative impact on clinical care. 
In 2002, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) issued a review of 100 studies on the 
impact of race and ethnicity of patients on the healthcare they received (Nelson et al., 
2002). The studies reviewed controlled for other potentially confounding variables 
(including socio-economic status, insurance, gender, etc.) in order to more accurately 
assess the specific impact of race and ethnicity. The authors of the report did not hide 
their surprise at the consistency of research findings indicating significant discrepancies 
in the receipt of clinical services between Caucasian and minority patients across disease 
areas (Nelson et al., 2002).  
In a separate study assessing physician attitudes towards patients of different 
races and socioeconomic statuses, the authors developed a 22-item survey to assess 
physician’s attitudes towards patients following routine cardiac procedure (Van Ryn & 
Burke, 2000). Physicians completed 618 surveys, subsequent to encounters with black, 
white, male and female patients. The investigators found that physicians participating in 
the study identified black patients as less intelligent than white patients, less likely to 
abstain from alcohol abuse, and less likely to be rational. Physicians participating in the 
study identified black patients as significantly less likely to be “pleasant or likable,” and 
significantly more likely to be medically non-compliant (p. 820). 
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It can be difficult to study racial bias among clinicians. People are unlikely to 
recognize bias, and factors such as social desirability lead to clinicians performing in a 
way they think is the most desirable and less reflective of unfiltered biases and beliefs. In 
one study specific to mental health, clinicians were primed with words associated with 
African American stereotypes (Negroes, Blacks, lazy, blues, rhythm, Africa, stereotype, 
ghetto, welfare, basketball, unemployed, and plantation). A comparison group was 
primed with neutral words (water, things, wood, television, etc.).  The clinician group 
exposed to the racially stereotypical words were significantly more likely to rate a 
fictional client presented in a subsequent clinical vignette more negatively on a rating 
scale, specifically on hostility-related measures (Abreu, 1999). A 2015 NIH-funded 
systematic review identified low-to-moderate levels of implicit bias across clinical 
professions: primary care, nursing, psychiatry and psychology (Hall et al., 2015). This 
review included the results of 15 unique studies, with only one not finding provider bias 
impacting health care decisions or treatment outcomes. 
The impact of bias on clinical judgment is not limited to race. In a seminal study 
on the influence of socio-economic class on psychiatric diagnoses, an otherwise vague 
clinical case study was much more likely to be assigned a severe diagnosis (psychotic 
disorder) if the client, identical in every other way to a comparison client, was believed 
by the clinician to belong to a lower socio-economic group (Di Nardo, 1975).  
Gender bias in clinical diagnosis has been studied for decades, but the findings 
remain controversial and subject to ongoing debate (Hartung & Widiger, 1998). The 
DSM-III was criticized for gender-bound descriptions of symptomology that might lead 
to an otherwise healthy female fulfilling the criteria for Histrionic or Borderline 
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Personality Disorder, if assessed at the wrong moment in time (Kaplan, 1983). With 
arguments about the gendered-assumptions of DSM architects, it has complicated the 
study of clinician versus construct issues when it comes to assessing the impact of gender 
on clinical diagnosis (Hartung & Widiger, 1998; Trechak, 1999). Even committee 
leadership who participated in the drafting of the DSM-III acknowledged significant 
conceptual issues around gender and conceded gender bias constituted “a major flaw in 
its scientific and clinical value” (Widiger & Spitzer, 1991, p. 2). 
Anchoring and Adjustment 
Within sociology and cognitive sciences, a number of studies have identified the 
phenomena in which information presented early bore significantly greater impact on 
formation of judgment than subsequent information presented.  The initial information 
creates an anchor, which constrains the degree to which subsequent information is 
utilized to adjust one’s judgment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). That is, “different 
starting points yield different estimates, which are biased towards the initial value,” 
(Tversky, 1974, p. 1128). Non-clinically, this phenomenon has been repeatedly 
demonstrated during sociological experiments (Friedlander & Stockman, 1983; Tversky, 
1974).  
Because clinicians are required to make judgments based on incomplete data, 
their first formulation should, ostensibly, adjust as new information supplements the 
initial clinical picture. If the literature on anchoring effects translates from general 
judgment to clinical judgment, there is the risk that clinical judgment is biased towards 
information that is presented early in the clinical assessment process.  Studies have 
produced varied results when testing potential anchoring effects on clinical judgment. In 
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one study, findings supported the anchoring effect of when information was presented, by 
using clinical vignettes with an otherwise identical symptom profile, manipulated only to 
present a history of Childhood Sexual Abuse (CSA) early in the vignette or later in the 
vignette. The study asked clinicians to form a diagnostic impression between PTSD or 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD).  Clinicians presented with the history of CSA 
early in the case presentation were significantly more likely to incorporate the trauma 
context into their diagnosis and assigned PTSD as the case assessment. Clinicians who 
were presented with the same vignette, but the CSA history presented later in the case 
review, were more likely to diagnose BPD (Woodward et al., 2009). 
The evidence of an anchoring effect on clinical judgment, however, is far from 
conclusive. Ellis, Robbins, Schult, Ladany, and Banker (1990) looked at the extent to 
which clinical judgments would be adjusted with the introduction of subsequent 
information, in this case, vignettes regarding a fictitious case example of a male 
presented with symptoms of an eating disorder. The “additional” information was 
intended to present a potentially new clinical picture, testing the power of the anchoring 
effect. Instead, they found the diagnosis arrived at by research participants did not reflect 
anchoring, and the research participants adjusted their diagnosis according to the new 
information. In another study, Friedlander and Stockman (1983) found mixed results. 
Utilizing clinical vignettes, the case presentations were altered in a manor to vary when 
salient diagnostic information was presented. In this case, significant anchoring effects 
were found in the case of a client who was presented as clinically moderate, but no 
anchoring effects were found with a client who was presented as severely suicidal.  
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Assessing Clinical Decision-Making 
Clinical vignettes are considered useful tools in assessing clinical decision-
making. They have been applied in nursing research to examine professionals’ attitudes 
and beliefs (Evans et al., 2015; Hughes, 02). They have also been used in social work 
research to evaluate clinical judgment in mental health and child welfare systems 
(Wallander, 2011). Psychology researchers have utilized clinical vignettes to assess the 
impact of provider bias in clinical assessment (Evans et al., 2015). Vignettes have the 
value of being inexpensive and much easier to conduct than an observational study. It is a 
well-validated component of experimental analysis in social and medical science research 
(Evans, Roberts, Keeley, & Blossom, 2005; Mendel et al., 2011; Veloski, Tai, Evans, & 
Nash, 2005; Wallander, 2011; Woodward et al., 2009). 
In summary, while PTSD prevalence estimates vary, most national estimates 
range between 12% and 21% (Hoge et al., 2014; Holdeman, 2009; Kilpatrick et al., 2013; 
Ramchand et al., 2010; Richardson, Frueh, & Acierno, 2010; Tanielian, 2009). In 
addition, PTSD as a diagnostic construct changes frequently (Bodkin et al., 2007b; 
McNally, 2012) and that may lead to clinically variable conceptualization among 
providers assessing real-time patients in the process of conducting a diagnostic 
assessment (Keane et al., 1997; Rosen & Lilienfeld, 2008). Additionally, clinical 
judgment has been shown to be influenced by a number of non-clinical factors which 
may impact diagnostic accuracy. Given the importance of appropriate diagnosis and 
screening for PTSD, this study intends to fill the gap in the current literature in how 
veteran status specifically influences diagnostic decision-making.  
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For the purpose of the present study, clinical vignettes were applied in an effort to 
test the following hypothesis: clinicians presented with a vague symptom report are more 
likely to diagnose PTSD if they are presented information that the patient has a history of 
military service compared to clinicians presented with the same symptom report with no 
disclosure of military history and is instead identified as a teacher. Additionally, 
exploratory analysis was conducted on participant factors to measure which clinician 
characteristics may have a moderating effect on the diagnosis of PTSD, including time in 
clinical practice, the era a clinician was trained (under DSM-IV or DSM-5), theoretical 
orientation, professional license type and/or status, race, gender, age, practice setting, and 
practice location. 
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Chapter 2: Research Design and Methods 
Methods 
The primary purpose of this study was to evaluate the influence of a single, non-
symptom variable on the assessment of PTSD by clinical professionals. More 
specifically, the aim was to test the hypothesis that disclosure of military service may be 
interpreted as equivalent to a criterion A stressor, even in the absence of any description 
of trauma associated with military history. A secondary aim of the study was to explore 
moderating effects on diagnosis based on participant characteristics. Two vignettes, 
identical with the exception of veteran status, were drafted to represent a vague symptom 
profile, unremarkable for any clear diagnostic symptoms. In order to evaluate for the 
specific impact of disclosure of military service, the vignettes excluded any discussion of 
trauma or stressors in order to avoid any other priming towards a PTSD diagnosis. In 
addition, the vignettes did not identify client gender or age, and included vague 
symptoms common to any number of affective disorders, thereby isolating military 
service as the sole variable under examination. For equivalency between vignettes, a 
profession was assigned to the control group: teacher. To test the hypotheses, respondents 
consenting to an anonymous online diagnostic survey were randomly assigned to the 
vignette with or without the disclosure of a history of military service. All procedures 
were approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board. 
Creation of Vignettes 
To ensure the verisimilitude of the vignettes, a draft vignette was presented to a 
panel of experts. The panel was composed of 11 mental health providers across 
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disciplines: psychiatry, social work, psychology, and psychiatric nurse practitioners. Each 
panel member was in possession of their current license and was in practice more than 6 
years across a variety of settings, including community mental health, academic settings, 
private practice, inpatient psychiatry, and in military and veteran-specific treatment 
centers. Vignettes were emailed to panel members individually with a request to suggest 
edits which would capture the most commonly reported, diagnostically agnostic 
complaints presented in early clinical assessments. All panel members responded with 
input and the vignettes were refined following feedback.  
Following the input from the panel members, the vignettes were redrafted and 
resubmitted to the panel. Once each individual panel member responded via email that 
this was a reasonable, common and vague presentation, the vignette was finalized to 
include the following characteristics: 
• Insomnia: In addition to being a specific, diagnosable disorder, insomnia is 
strongly associated with depression (where it is named as a specific criteria for 
diagnosis), anxiety, and PTSD (Baglioni et al., 2011; Inman, Silver, & 
Doghramji, 1990; Taylor, Lichstein, Durrence, Reidel, & Bush, 2005; Walsh, 
2004). 
• Emotional detachment: This is a hallmark symptom of depression, but is also 
accounted for in the criterion D symptoms of PTSD in the DSM-5 (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
• Difficulty relaxing and enjoying things: This is a vague characteristic not 
linked to any specific diagnosis. Any individual with any mental health or 
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physical health diagnosis, depending on diagnostic severity, could report this 
characteristic. 
• Relational difficulties with significant other: This is a vague characteristic not 
linked to any specific diagnosis. Any individual with any mental health or 
physical health diagnosis, depending on diagnostic severity, could report this 
characteristic. 
• Irritability and anger: This symptom is frequently associated with a variety of 
diagnoses including depression, PTSD, and bipolar II disorder (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
• Frequent worry and rumination: Patterns that reflect anxious anticipation or 
repetitive and negative thinking styles are also not unique to any specific 
diagnosis, but are reported by individuals with anxiety, depression, mild 
mania, PTSD and bereavement. Note: in order to avoid a direct correlation to 
the PTSD symptom of intrusive thoughts, there is no mention or description of 
thought intrusion. 
Study participants (described below) were invited to assess a clinical vignette and 
answer a diagnostic survey based upon their interpretation of the symptoms presented. 
The clinicians were randomly assigned to one of two vignettes, one with history of 
military service and one without history of military service. Our experimental group 
(those receiving a vignette with a history of military service) is designated Group A while 
the other, control, group is designated Group B. For the purpose of balance, the Group B 
vignette included a description that the client was a school teacher. The vignette and the 
post-vignette survey questions are presented in Appendix A. 
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Sample Size and Recruitment 
Recruitment email requests were sent to Association for Behavioral and Cognitive 
Therapies member-only listserv and National Council for Behavioral Health member-
organization email distribution list. Recruitment requests were also posted on social 
media, including the following Facebook group pages: Military Social Work, Association 
of Professional Social Work, Military Mental Health Providers, American Psychological 
Association Division 19 (Military Psychology), American Psychological Association 
public group.  Respondents were all offered the opportunity to be entered into a 
sweepstakes for one of 10 $50 electronic Amazon gift-cards for participating.  
Power Analysis 
Studies of the effect of bias and heuristics on diagnoses of mental illness using 
vignettes similar to that proposed in the current study have reported effect sizes ranging 
from small to large depending on the bias or heuristic under study. The number of 
diagnostic criteria and the addition of criteria deemed important to the diagnosis were 
found to have large effects on diagnosis (Bruchmuller & Meyer, 2009; Wolkenstein, 
Bruchmüller, Schmid, & Meyer, 2011). However, therapeutic approach (Bruchmuller & 
Meyer, 2009) and the gender of the patient (Høye, Rezvy, Hansen, & Olstad, 2006) were 
found to have small effects on diagnosis. In order to assure the sample size needed for the 
power to detect the effect of the variables of interest on diagnostic decisions using 
vignettes, two power analyses were conducted. The first was conducted to identify the 
sample size needed to detect a difference between two independent proportions, or the 
difference in diagnosis between the experimental and control groups with or without the 
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addition of a military history. Based on previous literature, a large effect was assumed 
and used in Cohen’s power table with a p < 0.05 and a power of 0.80, identifying a 
sample size of n=25 per group or a total sample of N=50 (Cohen, 1992). The second 
analysis was conducted to identify the sample size needed to explore the moderating 
effect of respondent license type/status and era trained (under DSM-IV or DSM-5) on 
diagnosis with or without the addition of a military history. Based on previous literature, 
a small effect on the difference between two independent proportions was assumed and 
used in Cohen’s power table, a p < 0.05, and a power of 0.80, which identified a sample 
size of n=392 per group for a total sample of N=784.  
Inclusion Criteria 
Participation was limited to English-speaking adults who graduated from a 
professional, clinical mental health program, with a minimum of a master’s degree. 
Acceptable degrees included counseling, psychology, social work, marriage and family 
therapy, psychiatric nursing, and psychiatry. Participants were required to have 
completed at least one full graduate course in diagnostic assessment of mental health 
disorders. This survey was open to clinically licensed professionals with provisional or 
full licenses, as well as graduates of clinical mental health programs who had not yet 
obtained their provisional license. Licensure status was self-reported and was not 
verified. See Appendix B for the Letter of Invitation. 
Eligibility Questions (these were included in the invitation email directly above 
the link to the survey):  
• I have completed a graduate program in a clinical (mental health) program: y/n 
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• I have completed at least one full graduate course in the assessment and diagnosis 
of mental health disorders: y/n 
Setting: This was an online study consisting of a single survey. A direct link to the 
survey was provided through email and social media recruitment.  
Randomization 
Using Qualtrics, one group of randomly assigned clinicians, Group A, received 
the case presentation in which the “client” was identified as a “veteran.” The second 
group of randomly assigned clinicians, Group B, received an identical symptom report 
but the client was identified as a “school teacher.” Random assignment was set for a 1-to-
1 distribution. Standardized response options were provided in an effort to gather 
consistent and interpretable data. Randomization occurred after respondents provided 
Informed Consent via electronic signature. 
Measures 
Participants were asked to report anonymously on demographic and professional 
data, including: licensure status, time in practice, DSM training, highest degree achieved 
and in what field, theoretical orientation, practice experience with populations, practice 
experience with disorders, current practice setting, gender identification, and ethnicity. 
Standardized answers were provided where applicable to facilitate exploratory analysis. 
Immediately following the vignette, respondents were asked to answer the 
questions shown in Figure 2.1. 
Human subjects 
This was a fully voluntary and anonymous online survey delivered to a 
professional population. There was no personally identifiable information about 
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participants associated with their survey responses. After completing the survey, all 
participants were invited to go to a unique link and enter their email in order to receive a 
gift card if selected. The email addresses were not linked to any survey responses and a 
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blinded process allowed for participants to share their email without risk of personally 
identifying data being associated with their survey responses. Survey vignettes did not 
Figure 2.1 Survey Questions for Primary Diagnosis, Rule-outs and Not 
Supported Diagnoses Based on Vignette Presentation 
Question 1. 
Based upon the vignette you have just read, please identify the primary 
diagnosis you would first consider for this client. Because you have been 
provided intentionally limited data, please extrapolate to the best of your 
ability, a single diagnosis from the list below you feel best reflects the client’s 
presentation. 
o Anxiety Disorder 
o Bipolar I Disorder  
o Bipolar II Disorder  
o Borderline Personality Disorder 
o Major Depressive Disorder 
o Persistent Depressive Disorder (formerly Dysthymic Disorder) 
o Posttraumatic Stress Disorder  
 
Question 2.  
Please select up to 3 diagnoses you would pursue in further assessment as 
possible rule-outs, or "No rule-outs": 
o Anxiety Disorder 
o Bipolar I Disorder  
o Bipolar II Disorder  
o Borderline Personality Disorder 
o Major Depressive Disorder 
o Persistent Depressive Disorder (formerly Dysthymic Disorder) 
o Posttraumatic Stress Disorder  
o No rule-outs 
 
Question 3. 
Please select which diagnoses, if any, you feel are not supported by any 
information presented in the vignette, or "No selection". There is no limit to 
the number of diagnoses you may select. 
o Anxiety Disorder 
o Bipolar I Disorder  
o Bipolar II Disorder  
o Borderline Personality Disorder 
o Major Depressive Disorder 
o Persistent Depressive Disorder (formerly Dysthymic Disorder) 
o Posttraumatic Stress Disorder  
o No selection 
 
Crystal Shelton 
40 
 
include any confidential information about a real individual. There were minimal risks 
associated with participation. Informed consent was signed electronically by participants 
through Qualtrics prior to beginning survey (see Appendix C). These procedures were 
approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board. 
Analysis Plan 
The first set of the analyses was conducted to describe the sample as a whole. 
Frequencies were run for categorical and binary variable and descriptive statistics 
(means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values) were run to describe 
continuous variables. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Logistic regression analyses were conducted to test the hypotheses that the 
experimental group (Group A) would have a higher proportion of providers who select 
PTSD (309.81) as the code corresponding to the clinical presentation or list PTSD as a 
rule-out option compared to the control group (Group B). If NA is the total size of group 
A and DA is the number of providers in group A who gave PTSD as their diagnostic code 
or rule-out option, the calculated proportion is PA = DA / NA; similarly for group B (the 
control group): PB = DB / NB. The hypothesized difference between groups in selecting 
PTSD is predicted based on the presence of disclosure of history of military service as 
part of the experimental vignette but not the control vignette, which was expected to 
increase the likelihood that PTSD will be diagnosed:  PA > PB.  
Crystal Shelton 
41 
 
Dummy Variables  
Prior to hypothesis testing, dummy variables for PTSD as a primary diagnosis and 
PTSD as a rule-out were created to transform categorical variables into binary variables 
for logistic regression analyses: 
PTSD Diagnosis (DV)  
To compare whether a PTSD diagnosis was chosen or not, a binary variable was 
created, with the response option “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder” coded as 1 and all other 
response options (Major Depressive Disorder, Persistent Depressive Disorder, Anxiety 
Disorder, Bipolar I and Bipolar II Disorders, and Borderline Personality Disorder) coded 
as 0.  
PTSD Selected as rule-out option (DV)  
To compare whether PTSD was selected as a rule-out option or not in the case 
that it was not selected as the primary diagnosis, a binary variable was created with value 
1 if response option “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder” was selected as a rule-out and 0 if it 
was not. 
Equivalency of Experimental and Control Groups   
Of the sample of 366 clinicians who participated in the study, 187 (51%) were 
randomized to the experimental group (vignette with client identified as a Veteran) and 
179 (49%) randomized into the control group (vignette with client identified as a 
Teacher). Chi-square tests of independence were performed to assess the equivalence of 
the experimental and control groups on all categorical variables (Licensure status, DSM 
training, Field of Highest Degree, Education Level, Theoretical Orientation, Practice 
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Experience with Populations, Practice Experience with Disorders, Current Practice 
Setting, Gender Identification, and Ethnicity) and binary regression analysis was 
conducted on the single continuous variable (years in practice). 
The complete set of chi-square tables and binary regression analysis is provided in 
Appendix D.  No significant differences were found between the experimental (Veteran) 
and control (Teacher) groups on any characteristic except for theoretical orientation (see 
Table D.5). 
 
Exploratory Analysis 
Since the required sample size as indicated by the power analysis was not 
reached, analysis of the moderators was exploratory. Exploratory analysis was conducted 
to determine if clinician characteristics including Licensure status, DSM training, Field of 
Highest Degree, Education Level, and Theoretical Orientation acted as moderators of any 
effect of history of military service on selection of diagnosis of PTSD. To do this, a series 
of 3-way chi-square tables were used to layer clinician characteristics on the original 
group diagnosis test used in hypothesis testing. Differences between clinician 
characteristic sub-groups within experimental and control groups on diagnosis of PTSD 
were considered evidence for moderation. 
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Chapter 3: Results 
Sample Characteristics 
A total of 366 clinicians with an average of 11 years of practice experience 
(sd=9.25) participated in the study. Seventy five percent (n=276) of participants reported 
being licensed, 70% (n=255) reported being trained at the Masters level, just over half 
reported having a degree in social work [56% (n=206)], and almost half reported having a 
cognitive-behavioral theoretical orientation [45% (n=165)]. Thirty four percent (n=126) 
of participants reported being trained using the fourth version of the Diagnostic and 
Statistics Manual (DSM-IV) and 35% (n=128) reported being trained using both the 
fourth (DSM-IV) and fifth versions (DSM-5), with a smaller percentage trained only on 
the DSM-5 [24% (n=86)]. See Table 3.1 for more details. 
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Table 3.1 Educational, Training and Theoretical Background of Study Participants 
 Variable Frequency Percent 
License Held 
Fully Licensed 276 75.41 
Unlicensed or 
Provisionally Licensed 
90 24.59 
DSM Training 
DSM-IV 126 34.43 
DSM-5 86 23.50 
Both DSM-IV and DSM-5 128 34.97 
Neither or DSM-III 26 7.10 
Degree 
Social Work 206 56.28 
Psychology 104 28.42 
Counseling 38 10.38 
Nursing 10 2.73 
Psychiatry 8 2.19 
Education 
Bachelors 9 2.46 
Masters 255 69.67 
Doctoral 102 27.87 
Theoretical 
Orientation 
Cognitive-Behavioral 165 45.08 
Eclectic 58 15.85 
Humanistic / Person 
Centered 
43 11.75 
Psychodynamic 29 7.92 
I do not have a primary 
orientation 
47 12.84 
Other 24 6.56 
   
Participants reported a range of specialized clinical practice experience and 
current practice settings. As shown in Table 3.2, approximately half of the participants 
reported having specialized practice experience which included children/adolescents 
[53% (n=192)], followed by families/couples [43% (n=158)], and women [47% (n=172)]. 
The most common disorders participants reported having specialized practice experience 
with included trauma disorders [73% (n =268)], serious and persistent mental illness 
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[52% (n=191)], followed by affective disorders [52% (n=187)]. Respondents worked in a 
diverse set of practice settings with about a quarter working in private practice [24% 
(n=87)] settings with groups and individuals. 
Table 3.2 Study Participants' Practice Experiences (Treated Populations, Disorders 
and Current Practice Settings) 
 Variable Frequency Percent 
Population 
Child/Adolescents 192 52.46 
College Students 116 31.69 
Families/Couples 158 43.17 
Gerontology 66 18.03 
LGBT 85 23.22 
Veteran/Military 125 34.15 
Women 172 46.99 
Other 58 15.85 
Disorders 
Affective Disorders 187 51.09 
Compulsive / Addictive 104 28.42 
Eating Disorders 33 9.02 
Health Psychology 74 20.22 
Serious and Persistent Mental Illness 191 52.19 
Personality Disorders 152 41.53 
Substance Abuse 152 41.53 
Trauma 268 73.22 
Other 40 10.93 
Setting 
Individual or Group Private Practice 87 23.80 
Non-Gov Healthcare System, Inpatient or 
Outpatient 
63 17.20 
City, County or State MH Services 33 9.00 
Federal Agency (VA, DoD, BIA, etc) 59 16.10 
Non-Profit Organization 72 19.70 
School (through 12th grade) 13 3.60 
College or University Counseling Center 9 2.50 
Other 30 8.20 
  
As shown in Table 3.3, the majority of the sample identified as female [85% 
(n=311)] and most reported being of White/European descent [79% (n=288)].  
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Table 3.3 Demographic Characteristics of Study Participants 
 Variable Frequency Percent 
Gender ID 
Female 311 84.97 
Male 54 14.75 
Non-Conforming 1 0.27 
Ethnicity 
Asian 6 1.64 
Black / African-American 25 6.83 
Hispanic / Latinx 19 5.19 
Pacific Islander 1 0.27 
White / European 288 78.69 
Multi-ethnic 20 5.46 
Prefer not to answer 7 1.91 
 
Vignette Diagnosis 
As shown in Table 3.4, the disorders most commonly identified for the primary 
diagnosis across both groups included Anxiety Disorder [30% (n=108)], Major 
Depressive Disorder [30% (n=108)], and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder [29% (n=106)]. 
Two-thirds of participants reported Anxiety Disorders as a rule-out diagnoses [64% 
(n=233)], with over half also reporting Major Depressive Disorder [57% (n=207)], and 
almost half listing Posttraumatic Stress Disorder [48% (n=177)]. 
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Table 3.4  Primary and Rule-out Diagnoses For Total  Sample 
 Variable Frequency Percent 
Diagnosis 
Anxiety Disorder 108 29.51 
Bipolar I Disorder 3 0.82 
Bipolar II Disorder 6 1.64 
Borderline Personality Disorder 8 2.19 
Major Depressive Disorder 108 29.51 
Persistent Depressive Disorder 27 7.38 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 106 28.96 
Rule-out 
Anxiety Disorder 233 63.66 
Bipolar I Disorder 42 11.48 
Bipolar II Disorder 77 21.04 
Borderline Personality Disorder 53 14.48 
Major Depressive Disorder 207 56.56 
Persistent Depressive Disorder 122 33.33 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 177 48.36 
No Rule-outs 11 3.01 
 
Experiment v Control: PTSD as Primary Diagnosis 
Figure 3.1 summarizes the frequencies of primary diagnoses for the experimental 
(Veteran vignette) and control (Teacher vignette) groups.  The category “All Other” is 
composed of diagnoses of Anxiety, Bipolar I and II Disorders, Borderline Personality 
Disorder and Persistent Depressive Disorder.  
Of the 187 clinicians presented with the Veteran vignette, 84 (45%) identified 
PTSD as their primary diagnosis, while only 22 (12%) of those presented with the 
Teacher vignette identified PTSD as their primary diagnosis. Further, 44 (24%) and 42 
(22%) of the clinicians presented with the Veteran vignette identified Anxiety Disorder 
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and Major Depressive Disorder respectively, compared to 64 (36%) and 66 (37%) of the 
clinicians presented with the Teacher vignette. 
Logistic regression analysis was conducted to test the likelihood that group 
assignment (Veteran versus Teacher) would predict the selection of PTSD as the primary 
diagnosis (Table 3.5). Cases in which the client was identified as a Veteran were almost 6 
times more likely to be given a primary diagnosis of PTSD than cases in which the client 
was identified as a Teacher [OR=5.82, p=0.00]. 
 
Table 3.5  Logistic Regression of the Likelihood of Selecting PTSD as the Primary 
Diagnosis in the Experimental Versus Control Group 
   95% C.I. for OR 
 Odds Ratio p-value Lower Upper 
Group Assignment 5.82 0.00 3.42 9.90 
Constant 0.14 0.00   
84
44 42
17
22
64 66
27
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder
Anxiety Disorder Major Depressive
Disorder
All OtherC
o
u
n
ts
 o
f 
C
li
n
ic
ia
n
s 
Se
le
ct
in
g 
P
ri
m
ar
y
 D
ia
gn
o
si
s 
b
y
 G
ro
u
p
 A
ss
ig
n
m
en
t
Participants Assigned to Veteran Vignette (Experimental)
Participants Assigned to Teacher Vignette (Control)
Figure 3.1 Primary Diagnosis Frequencies by Group Assignment 
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Experimental v Control: PTSD as a Rule-Out Diagnosis 
Logistic regression analysis was conducted to test the likelihood that group 
assignment (Veteran versus Teacher vignette) would predict the identification of PTSD 
as a rule-out diagnosis. As shown in Table 3.6, the odds of reporting PTSD as a rule-out 
diagnosis were not significantly greater for clinicians assigned to the experimental 
(Veteran) group than those assigned to the control (Teacher) group [OR=0.69, p=0.08].  
 
Table 3.6  Logistic Regression of the Likelihood of Identifying PTSD as a Rule-out 
Disorder in the Experimental Versus Control Group 
   95% C.I. for OR 
 Odds Ratio p-value Lower Upper 
Group Assignment 0.69 0.08 0.46 1.04 
Constant 1.13 0.41   
 
Exploratory Analysis 
Exploratory analysis was conducted to test the possibility that clinician 
characteristics, including Licensure, DSM Training, Field of Highest Degree, Education 
Level, or Theoretical Orientation would act as moderators of the effect of group 
assignment (Veteran versus Teacher) on the selection of PTSD as the primary diagnosis. 
Only those clinician characteristics with significant results are reported. 
Licensure. As seen in Table 3.7, more licensed clinicians assigned the Veteran 
vignette diagnosed the client with PTSD (Std. Residuals = 3.8) than would be expected, 
suggesting that the client characteristic of “Veteran” impacted the licensed clinicians’ 
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decision to select PTSD as the primary diagnosis. Fewer licensed clinicians assigned the 
Teacher vignette diagnosed the client with PTSD (Std. Residuals = -3.9) and more 
diagnosed the client with Major Depressive Disorder (Std. Residuals = 2.0) than would be 
expected, suggesting that the client characteristic of “Teacher” also impacted licensed 
clinicians’ diagnostic decisions. No more or fewer provisionally/unlicensed clinicians 
diagnosed the client with PTSD whether assigned the Veteran (Std. Residuals = 1.3) or 
Teacher vignette (Std. Residuals = -1.3). 
Overall, it appears that being fully licensed impacted the selection of PTSD as the 
primary diagnosis based on client characteristics, while being unlicensed or provisionally 
licensed did not. These findings suggest a moderating effect of licensure status on the 
effect that client characteristics have on the diagnosis of PTSD. 
Table 3.7 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experimental Versus Control Groups 
on Selecting PTSD as the Primary Diagnosis by Licensure Status 
  Random Assignment 
  Teacher Veteran 
License Held Diagnosis Count (Std Res) Count (Std Res) 
Fully Licensed 
Anxiety 48 (1.7) 30 (-1.6) 
Bipolar 5 (1.2) 1 (-1.2) 
Depression 61 (2.0) 37 (-1.9) 
PTSD 17 (-3.9) 71 (3.8) 
Chi-square (3, N=270) = 0.30, p = 0.00 
Unlicensed or 
Provisionally 
Licensed 
Anxiety 16 (0.3) 14 (-0.3) 
Bipolar 2 (0.4) 1 (-0.4) 
Depression 21 (0.6) 16 (-0.6) 
PTSD 5 (-1.3) 13 (1.3) 
Chi-square (3, N=88) = 0.30, p = 0.00 
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DSM Training. As seen in Table 3.8, more clinicians trained using DSM-IV 
assigned to the Veteran vignette diagnosed the client with PTSD (Std. Residuals = 2.8) 
than would be expected by chance, suggesting that the client characteristic of “Veteran” 
impacted the DSM-IV trained clinicians’ decision to select PTSD as the primary 
diagnosis. Fewer clinicians trained using DSM-IV assigned the “Teacher” vignette 
diagnosed the client with PTSD (Std. Residuals = -2.8) than would be expected by 
chance, suggesting that the client characteristic of “Teacher” also impacted the DSM-IV 
trained clinicians’ decision to not use PTSD as the primary diagnosis. 
No more or fewer clinicians trained using DSM-5 diagnosed the client with PTSD 
whether they were assigned the “Veteran” (Std. Residuals = 1.4) or “Teacher” (Std. 
Residuals = -1.4) vignette than would be expected by chance, suggesting that client 
characteristics did not impact the DSM-5 trained clinicians’ decisions to use PTSD as the 
primary diagnosis. 
More clinicians trained using both DSM-IV and DSM-5 assigned the Veteran 
vignette diagnosed the client with PTSD (Std. Residuals = 2.5) than would be expected 
by chance, suggesting that the client characteristic of “Veteran” impacted the DSM-
IV/DSM-5 trained clinicians’ decision to use PTSD as the primary diagnosis. Fewer 
clinicians assigned to the Teacher vignette trained using both DSM-IV and DSM-5 
diagnosed the client with PTSD (Std. Residuals = -2.3) than would be expected by 
chance, suggesting that the client characteristic of “Teacher” impacted the DSM-
IV/DSM-5 trained clinicians’ decision to not select PTSD as the primary diagnosis. 
Overall, it appears that being trained on the DSM-IV, whether alone or with the 
DSM-5, increases the likelihood of selecting PTSD as the primary diagnosis based on 
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client characteristics. It does not appear to be the case for clinicians trained using only the 
DSM-5. These findings suggest that the version of the DSM with which clinicians were 
trained moderated the effect of client characteristics on selecting PTSD as the primary 
diagnosis. 
 
Table 3.8 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experimental Versus Control Group 
on Selecting PTSD as the Primary Diagnosis by DSM Training 
  Random Assignment 
  Teacher Veteran 
Training Diagnosis Count (Std Res) Count (Std Res) 
DSM-IV 
Anxiety 26 (1.5) 13 (-1.5) 
Bipolar 1 (0.7) 0 (-0.7) 
Depression 28 (1.0) 19 (-1.0) 
PTSD 6 (-2.8) 30 (2.8) 
Chi-square (3, N=123) = 0.35, p = 0.00 
DSM-5 
Anxiety 16 (0.9) 11 (-0.8) 
Bipolar 1 (-0.4) 2 (0.3) 
Depression 18 (0.3) 17 (-0.3) 
PTSD 5 (-1.3) 14 (1.3) 
Chi-square (3, N=84) = 0.20, p = 0.07 
Both DSM-IV and DSM-5 
Anxiety 19 (0.2) 15 (-0.3) 
Bipolar 5 (1.5) 0 (-1.5) 
Depression 32 (1.4) 15 (-1.5) 
PTSD 10 (-2.3) 29 (2.5) 
Chi-square (3, N=26) = 0.22, p = 0.01 
 
Theoretical Orientation. As seen in Table 3.9, more clinicians with a Cognitive-
Behavioral orientation assigned to the Veteran vignette diagnosed the client with PTSD 
(Std. Residuals = 3.3) than would be expected by chance, suggesting that the client 
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characteristic of “Veteran” impacted the Cognitive-Behavioral oriented clinicians’ 
decision to use PTSD as the primary diagnosis. Fewer clinicians with a Cognitive-
Behavioral orientation assigned the Teacher vignette diagnosed the client with PTSD 
(Std. Residuals = -3.4) than would be expected by chance, suggesting that the client 
characteristic of “Teacher” impacted the Cognitive-Behavioral orientated clinicians’ 
decision to not use PTSD as the primary diagnosis. 
No more or fewer clinicians with an Eclectic orientation assigned the Veteran 
vignette diagnosed the client with PTSD (Std. Residuals = 1.9) than would be expected 
by chance, suggesting that the client characteristic of “Veteran” did not impact the 
Eclectic oriented clinicians’ decision to use PTSD as the primary diagnosis. Fewer 
clinicians with an Eclectic orientation assigned to the Teacher vignette diagnosed the 
client with PTSD (Std. Residuals = -2.2) than would be expected, suggesting that the 
client characteristic of “Teacher” impacted the Eclectic oriented clinicians’ decision to 
use or not use PTSD as the primary diagnosis. 
No more or fewer clinicians with a Human/Person Centered orientation diagnosed 
the client with PTSD whether they were assigned the Veteran (Std. Residuals=0.4) or 
Teacher (Std. Residuals= -0.5) than would be expected by chance, suggesting that client 
characteristics did not impact the Human/Person Centered clinicians’ decision to use or 
not use PTSD as the primary diagnosis. 
No more or fewer clinicians with a Psychodynamic orientation diagnosed the 
client with PTSD whether they were assigned the Veteran (Std. Residuals = 0.9) or 
Teacher (Std. Residuals = -0.9) than would be expected, suggesting that the client 
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characteristic did not impact the Psychodynamic oriented clinicians’ decision to use or 
not use PTSD as the primary diagnosis. 
Overall, it appears that having a Cognitive-Behavioral orientation increases the 
likelihood of diagnosing PTSD based on the Veteran client characteristic. It does not 
appear to be the case for those with an Eclectic, Humanistic/Person Centered or 
Psychodynamic orientation. These findings suggest a moderating effect of theoretical 
orientation on the impact of client characteristics on the diagnosis of PTSD. 
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Table 3.9 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experimental Versus Control Groups 
on Selecting PTSD as the Primary Diagnosis by Theoretical Orientation 
  Random Assignment 
  Teacher Veteran 
Orientation Diagnosis Count (Std Res) Count (Std Res) 
Cognitive-Behavioral 
Anxiety 30 (1.4) 17 (-1.4) 
Bipolar 3 (1.3) 0 (-1.2) 
Depression 38 (1.6) 22 (-1.5) 
PTSD 8 (-3.4) 43 (3.3) 
Chi-square (3, N=161) = 0.34, p = 0.00 
Eclectic 
Anxiety 8 (0.7) 7 (-0.6) 
Depression 13 (1.7) 7 (-1.4) 
PTSD 2 (-2.3) 19 (1.9) 
Chi-square (3, N=56) = 0.10, p = 0.00 
Humanistic /  
Person Centered 
Anxiety 6 (-0.2) 9 (0.1) 
Bipolar 0 (-0.7) 1 (0.6) 
Depression 8 (0.8) 6 (-0.7) 
PTSD 4 (-0.5) 8 (0.4) 
Chi-square (3, N=42) = -0.10, p = 0.89 
Psychodynamic 
Anxiety 6 (0.3) 5 (-0.3) 
Bipolar 1 (0.7) 0 (-0.7) 
Depression 5 (0.3) 4 (-0.3) 
PTSD 2 (-0.9) 6 (0.9) 
Chi-square (3, N=22) = 0.27, p = 0.24 
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Chapter 4: Discussion and Conclusion 
This study set out to test the impact of a single non-symptom variable on mental 
health diagnosis. We sought to identify, specifically, if the designation of “veteran” or 
“teacher” in an otherwise identical case presentation would impact diagnosis. The study 
vignettes were drafted such that symptoms were described vaguely, and made no mention 
of traumatic exposure, arguably the cornerstone symptom of PTSD and it was 
hypothesized that the designation of “veteran” would lead to higher diagnoses of PTSD 
than would the designation of “teacher”. The hypothesis was supported: case vignettes 
where the client was identified as a veteran were 6-times more likely to be diagnosed 
with PTSD than those vignettes where the client was identified as a teacher. Additional 
findings of interest indicated clinicians’ diagnostic judgement were moderated by time in 
practice and professional training in DSM and Cognitive-Behavioral Theoretical 
Orientation. 
It is potentially not surprising that study participants would read the vignette 
about a veteran seeking treatment for vague mental health concerns and select PTSD as 
the likely issue. PTSD has routinely been described as the signature injury of OEF/OIF. 
The psychological impact of war has been studied extensively, with a significant portion 
of research focusing specifically on posttraumatic stress disorder. But the strength of the 
relationship between the variables of “veteran” and “PTSD” point to some of the current 
challenges in veteran’s mental health care. Service members and veterans have been 
found to experience depressive and anxiety disorders at an equal, if not greater, rate to 
PTSD  (Deployment Health Clinical Center, Defense Centers of Excellence for 
Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury Center, 2017).  
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Though PTSD prevalence rates are controversial and varied, the epidemiological 
data typically supports depression and PTSD occurring at an equivalent rate (Ramchand, 
Rudavsky, Grant, Tanielian, & Jaycox, 2015). If evidence-based treatments for PTSD 
were identical to evidence-based treatments for other common disorders in military 
personnel, effectively differentiating between disorders might not be as essential. This 
isn’t the case. Effective treatments for PTSD are significantly different from evidence-
based treatments for depression and therefore effective diagnostic differentiation is 
essential.  
There are a number of factors that might contribute to the strength of association 
between “veteran” and “PTSD.” In this study, three-quarters of the study participants 
reported having primary experience treating trauma-related disorders. The relationship 
between the high number of clinicians identifying PTSD for a veteran vignette and the 
high number of clinicians reporting trauma-focused clinical practice is non-trivial. As 
noted earlier in this paper, “representativeness” was one of the earliest heuristics 
described. Understood this way, veteran status represents a potentially trauma-exposed 
individual more than teacher status. With clinical heuristics and bias well documented in 
the literature, the findings here add evidence that veteran status has a powerful effect on 
diagnosis, disproportionately impacting diagnosis beyond the scope of clinical cues 
presented in the vignette. As noted previously, doctors and clinicians routinely use 
shortcuts in critical thinking in order to be able to sort through large volumes of 
information and make diagnostic assessments and determinations based on limited data. 
One question for future research then is, is veteran status becoming a functioning 
heuristic for PTSD? 
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In the exploratory analysis we found the impact of veteran status on the diagnosis 
of PTSD was moderated by clinician characteristics associated with training and 
licensure. Licensed clinicians assigned the veteran vignette were significantly more likely 
to diagnose PTSD than unlicensed clinicians assigned the same vignette. These findings 
are also consistent with early research of diagnostic accuracy based on time in practice. 
As noted earlier in this paper, clinical judgment is varied and not directly related to time 
in practice or training background. Clinicians do not necessarily become more accurate 
over time and instead, possibly become less likely to integrate new findings and new 
practice guidelines into their practice as they become habitual and entrenched in clinical 
patterns.  
Clinicians assigned the veteran vignette who were trained using DSM-IV were 
significantly more likely to diagnose PTSD than clinicians presented with the same 
vignette who trained under the DSM-5. Clinicians trained under DSM-5 were not swayed 
by the inclusion of veteran status and did not appear to mis-categorize it as symptom 
data. The neutrality through which clinicians trained specifically under DSM-5 viewed 
veteran status supports arguments made by the DSM-5 working group on PTSD that 
clearer definitions of a traumatic stressor, or Criterion A event, were needed and would 
limit diagnostic variability (Friedman, 2013). 
There are a number of reasons it is important to understand how veteran status 
might impact clinical diagnosis. While it would be impossible to have a discussion of 
veterans’ mental health without a significant focus on PTSD, it remains that depression, 
anxiety, and TBI are all significant issues, with depression occurring at rates equal or 
greater than PTSD for veterans. In spite of well-validated diagnostic and assessment tools 
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and evidence-based treatments, PTSD diagnosis and treatment can be challenging. It 
should help that a PTSD diagnosis requires a specific event, a stressor of significant and 
well-described magnitude, and the subsequent symptoms are nosologically related to the 
traumatic event. That said, the respondents in this study did not find the absence of a 
traumatic event essential.  
Future research is required to better understand to what extent the traumatic 
stressor criterion is actually valued in real world practice. Further, it is an interesting 
question of what drives the association of veteran status with PTSD. Veterans who have 
deployed have a higher traumatic-event exposure prevalence, and this may lead to some 
automatic associations for clinicians, in spite of the moderate-to-low likelihood that 
trauma exposure leads to PTSD. It is also possible that clinicians are guided by beliefs 
about military and combat that inform their clinical judgment and assume a high 
prevalence of trauma. 
Even without having a clear understanding of the reasons behind the causal 
linkage between “veteran” and “PTSD,” these findings point to the importance of the use 
of validated assessment measures in diagnosis. Incorporation of objective assessment 
measures can improve diagnostic accuracy across DSM categories. Specific to PTSD 
objective, validated assessment tools such as the Clinician Administered PTSD Scale, the 
Life-Events Checklist, and the Combat Exposure Scale should be broadly considered as a 
means of limiting subjectivity in the diagnostic process (Weathers, Blake, Schnurr, 
Kaloupek, Marx & Keane, 2012; Weathers, Blake, Schnurr, Kaloupek, Marx & Keane, 
2013; Keane, Fairbank, Caddell, Zimering, Taylor, Mora 1989). As noted in a thorough 
evaluation of practices and attitudes in the assessment of PTSD, there is wide variability 
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in how clinicians assess for PTSD, with a significant majority responding that they are 
unlikely to use validated assessment measures (Jackson et., al., 2011). But these findings 
imply that the absence of an index trauma, at least in an initial clinical assessment, is 
under-valued as important or relevant clinical information.  
An emphasis on validated assessment measures is important from a policy 
perspective, as well. Disability awards for PTSD far exceed all other mental health 
disability ratings associated with military service (Marx, et al., 2016). A number of 
studies have outlined PTSD-specific challenges in the current VA disability benefits 
process.  During a 2005 review conducted by the VA Office of the Inspector General, 
25% of the veterans awarded disability pensions for PTSD were lacking compelling 
medical evidence, including evidence of exposure to combat or trauma during military 
service (Freuh, Grubaugh, Elhai, & Buckley, 2007). The Compensation and Pension 
(C&P) has been scrutinized for not consistently adhering to best practice guidelines in 
evidence-based assessment, including validated assessment measures and Structured 
Clinical Interviews (Institute of Medicine, 2007; Russo, 2014). In an evaluation of the 
extent to which veterans service connection status corresponded to their diagnostic status 
researchers noted an alarming discordance between diagnostic and service connection 
status  (Marx, et al., 2016).  
While there have been ample studies conducted over the last two decades 
evaluating potential symptom overreporting and malingering by veterans seeking PTSD 
compensation, the present study findings support additional analysis on clinician-driven 
factors in diagnostic variation of PTSD. Clinicians conducting disability benefit 
assessments are responsible for identifying the experience that qualifies as meeting the 
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threshold for criterion A. The findings of this study, at least preliminarily, point to a more 
complex systematic issue than simple symptom over-reporting. Clinician characteristics 
and clinical practice approach might have a significant impact on the current state of the 
disability rating system for PTSD particularly if clinicians are not objectively valuing the 
presence or absence of a traumatic-stressor. 
Implications for Social Work Practice 
Social work education has long been involved in improving resources and care 
available to veterans and service members. In 2010 the Council on Social Work 
Education (CSWE) published guidelines for advanced practice in military social work. 
The core competencies described were updated again in 2018 (CSWE, 2018). Military 
social work and social work education in general has been responsible for significant 
improvements in programming, intervention, assessment and services. The CSWE 
guidelines reference the ethical responsibilities held by institutions focusing on military 
social work practice. The guidelines note the importance of: 
Balancing a strength-based treatment orientation with an increasingly 
disability-focused benefit system. There is an incredibly complex situation 
that continues to grow and morph around service-related disabilities and 
lifetime disability ratings for PTSD. Within this complex issue there are 
micro, mezzo, and macro challenges; questions about ethics; and questions 
about how our own beliefs and worldviews might affect how we care for 
our wounded, ill, and injured veterans (CSWE, 2018, p. xix). 
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The present study’s findings support the significant role social work education in general, 
and military social work programs specifically in high quality training in clinical 
assessment and military-culturally competent care. Programs focused on quality clinical 
training should integrate strong emphasis on evidence-based assessment and clinician 
awareness of non-clinical factors and how they impact diagnostic decision making. 
Clinical training programs should be grounded in the most current and well-supported 
evidence.  
Study Limitations 
This study has several limitations which must be considered when reviewing 
these findings. Fictional case vignettes have been identified as helpful in assessing 
general clinical decision-making skills, but they do not accurately capture or reflect real-
world clinical decision making. It is entirely possible that, while veteran status was 
overly-influential in a brief case review, real world diagnostic practice would place more 
emphasis on identifying a specific and relevant index trauma and PTSD-specific 
symptoms. Literature suggests that surveys and studies relying on clinical vignettes may 
be particularly vulnerable to social desirability bias (Peabody, Luck, Glassman, 
Dresselhaus, & Lee, 2000). Additionally, because veterans have higher base rates of 
trauma exposure than teachers, it is possible the survey results reflect clinicians ‘playing 
the odds.’ A single, brief vignette study does not allow for complex analysis of diagnostic 
decision making and we are unable to establish if the diagnostic conclusions of our 
participants conclusively demonstrate biased thinking or simple probabilistic reasoning.  
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The assignment of a profession, teacher, to the control group was intended to 
simply balance the vignettes. However, study respondents assigned to the control group, 
the “teacher” vignette, selected a diagnosis of depression at a greater rate than would be 
expected by chance. Though the survey was initially drafted to isolate veteran status as 
the sole variable under examination, it is clear that there is more to learn about the impact 
of “profession” in general. Finally, for the purpose of analyzing the moderating impact of 
clinician characteristics, the required sample size as indicated by the power analysis was 
not reached and analysis of the moderators was exploratory. 
Considerations for future research 
The findings highlighted the significant extent to which non-clinical factors are 
integrated into diagnostic decision-making. Additional research is needed to better 
understand the drivers of diagnostic decision making, including clinician and client 
characteristics. Future studies should include qualitative assessments of clinicians to 
further assess how beliefs about military service influence diagnosis. Moreover, a larger 
sample size of a broader range of providers across professional disciplines might be able 
to better evaluate what factors influence the weighting of non-symptom information in 
early clinical assessment. 
Furthermore, a tremendous effort has been undertaken by the Veterans 
Administration and DoD to ensure evidence-based treatments are available and specific 
to PTSD. Some researchers have used high rates of treatment attrition as evidence that 
the treatments themselves are ineffective for a broad population (Steenkamp & Litz, 
2014). Our findings support a broader analysis of treatment attrition and dropout to 
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evaluate for the possibility that PTSD is at times diagnosed even in the absence of a 
qualifying traumatic event, with inappropriate clients subsequently entered into PTSD 
treatment.  
Conclusion 
In spite of the study limitations, the findings support a strong connection between 
veteran status and the likelihood of a PTSD diagnosis. Given the continued relevance of 
improving treatment access and mental health outcomes for veterans, these present 
findings offer support for the utilization of objective assessment measures and ensuring 
all diagnostic possibilities are appropriately assessed for.  There will be value in 
continued research to better understand drivers of clinical decision-making. 
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Vignette 
A 32-year-old [veteran or school teacher based on randomization] presents for 
consultation at a mental health practice. They arrive 15 minutes late and they have not 
filled out paperwork that has been previously emailed to them. They appear slightly 
irritable when asked to fill out paperwork before seeing the therapist. During the 
diagnostic assessment the client reports they are presenting largely at their spouse’s 
behest. When asked what the main concerns might be, they note routine difficulty falling 
asleep, routinely laying in bed for several hours before falling into a fitful and 
intermittent sleep.  The client notes waking at every sound and then trouble falling back 
asleep. Overall, they report approximately 4-5 hours of sleep per night on average. 
During the early part of the assessment the client’s affect remains guarded and 
subdued and the interaction is notable for poor eye contact. When asked about further 
symptoms the client discloses they have been irritable. They gave an example: recently 
while making dinner, the client became frustrated by not being able to locate a commonly 
used cooking utensil. They noted they were unable to tolerate growing frustration and 
ultimately dumped over a kitchen drawer, causing everything to scatter. At this point the 
client reports their spouse came into the kitchen and the client said “They tried to calm 
me down, but that just made me angrier. I know they misplaced the spatula and even 
though I knew it was an over-reaction, I couldn’t bring myself down. Things like this 
happen on occasion and it takes me forever to cool down.” 
Further into the assessment, the client reports frequent “overthinking.” The client 
described ruminating on past events where they believe they have “messed up” in life and 
“let everyone down.”  They also described constant worry and a feeling of “waiting for 
the worst to happen.” The client does not disclose what they believe the “worst” would 
be, and they remain guarded on this point. The issue of anxious and ruminative thoughts 
come up throughout the assessment. They client ultimately describes frustration that they 
can’t “get myself to stop thinking about things sometimes.” 
Overall, they describe significant relational difficulties with their spouse who the 
client reports accuses them of being “checked out and always looking for a fight.” By 
their own interpretation, they note they feel “detached.” They indicate no current hobbies, 
no real desire to do things they previously enjoyed, and they find themselves avoiding 
public events and social gatherings, and making excuses to avoid “feeling overwhelmed” 
outside of work and home. Their affect remains subdued throughout the assessment. 
There is no notable psychomotor agitation, no identified health concerns, and they deny 
suicidal ideations.  
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Post-Vignette Questions 
Question 1. 
Based upon the vignette you have just read, please identify the primary diagnosis you 
would first consider for this client. Because you have been provided intentionally limited 
data, please extrapolate to the best of your ability, a single diagnosis from the list below 
you feel best reflects the client’s presentation. 
 
o Anxiety Disorder  
o Bipolar I Disorder 
o Bipolar II Disorder  
o Borderline Personality Disorder 
o Major Depressive Disorder 
o Persistent Depressive Disorder (formerly Dysthymic Disorder) 
o Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
 
Question 2.  
Please select up to 3 diagnoses you would pursue in further assessment as possible rule-
outs: 
 
o Anxiety Disorder  
o Bipolar I Disorder 
o Bipolar II Disorder  
o Borderline Personality Disorder 
o Major Depressive Disorder 
o Persistent Depressive Disorder (formerly Dysthymic Disorder) 
o Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
o No rule-outs 
 
Question 3. 
Please select which diagnoses, if any, you feel are not supported by any information 
presented in the vignette, or “No selection”. There is no limit to the number of diagnoses 
you may select. 
 
o Anxiety Disorder  
o Bipolar I Disorder 
o Bipolar II Disorder  
o Borderline Personality Disorder 
o Major Depressive Disorder 
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o Persistent Depressive Disorder (formerly Dysthymic Disorder) 
o Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
o No selection 
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Letter of Invitation 
Clinical Vignette Research Survey 
 
 
Dear Colleagues: 
  
This email is intended to solicit participation in my dissertation study, a brief, anonymous 
online-survey with IRB approval (830104).  The purpose of this study is to evaluate 
professional decision-making utilizing clinical vignettes. I am seeking clinical 
professionals at the masters and doctoral level to participate. 
 
All participants will be entered into a sweepstakes to win one of 10 $50 Amazon gift 
cards.  
 
You are eligible to participate in this study if you have received a graduate degree in a 
clinical mental health field and completed at least one full graduate course in diagnostic 
assessment. You may participate even if you have not yet obtained your clinical license. 
Fields of training are not excluded – that is, participants may be psychologists, social 
workers, psychiatric nurse practitioners, counselors, or psychiatrists. Time to participate 
is expected to take no more than 15 minutes. Participation is entirely anonymous and 
voluntary, and you may withdraw at any time.  
 
 Eligibility: 
• I have completed a graduate program in a clinical (mental health) program: y/n 
• I have taken at least one graduate course in diagnostic assessment of mental 
health disorders: y/n 
If you have answered yes to the above questions and are willing to participate, please 
click on the following link:  
 
[link omitted] 
  
 If you have any questions about this study, please contact the PI (Crystal Shelton at 
[email omitted]). 
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Informed Consent 
You are invited to participate in a web-based online survey on vignettes as a clinical 
decision-making tool. This is a research project being conducted by Crystal Shelton 
[email omitted]. It should take approximately 15 minutes to complete. University of 
Pennsylvania IRB protocol number 830104. 
  
PARTICIPATION 
Qualified participants will have graduated from a professional, clinical mental health 
program, with a minimum of a master’s degree. Acceptable degrees include counseling, 
psychology, social work, marriage and family therapy, psychiatric nursing, and 
psychiatry. Participants should have completed at least one full graduate course in 
diagnostic assessment of mental health disorders. This survey is open to clinically 
licensed professionals with provisional or full licenses, as well as graduates of clinical 
mental health programs who have not yet obtained their provisional license. 
  
The survey should take approximately 10 minutes to complete. Your participation in this 
survey is voluntary. You may refuse to take part in the research or exit the survey at any 
time without penalty. 
  
BENEFITS 
All participants who complete the survey will be given the opportunity to enter a raffle 
for one of 10 $50 Amazon gift cards. 
 
RISKS 
There are no foreseeable risks involved in participating in this study other than those 
encountered in day-to-day life. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Your survey answers will be sent to a link at Qualtrics.com, where data will be stored in a 
password protected electronic format. In order to receive a gift-card, participants will 
be asked at the end of the survey to provide the email address this letter was distributed 
to. Email addresses are in no way linked to the survey responses and your data will be 
completely anonymous. 
   
CONTACT 
If you have any general questions about this research or wish to obtain a copy of the 
results, please contact the PI: [email omitted]. If you feel you have not been treated 
according to the descriptions in this form, or that your rights as a participant in research 
have not been honored during the course of this project, or you have any questions, 
concerns, or complaints that you wish to address to someone other than the investigator, 
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you may contact University of Pennsylvania Institutional Research Board (IRB): [email 
omitted].  
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Table D.1 Logistic Regression Analysis of the Odds of Being Assigned the 
Experimental Group 
   95% C.I for OR 
 Odds Ratio p-value Lower Upper 
Years in Practice 1.00 0.67 0.97 1.02 
Constant 1.10 0.55   
 
 
Table D.2 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups 
on Licensure Status 
  Group Assignment 
  Teacher Veteran 
Fully Licensed 
Count 133 143 
Std Residual -0.2 0.2 
Provisionally or Unlicensed 
Count 46 44 
Std Residual 0.3 -0.3 
Chi-square (1, N=366) = 0.23, p = 0.63 
 
 
Table D.3 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups 
on Version of DSM Training 
  Group Assignment 
  Teacher Veteran 
DSM-IV 
Count 62 64 
Std Residual 0 0 
DSM-5 
Count 42 44 
Std Residual 0 0 
DSM-IV and DSM-5 
Count 67 61 
Std Residual 0.6 -0.5 
Neither or DSM-III 
Count 8 18 
Std Residual -1.3 1.3 
Chi-square(3, N=366) = 4.04, p = 0.26 
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Table D.4 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups 
on Field of Highest Degree 
  Group Assignment 
  Teacher Veteran 
Social Work 
Count 100 106 
Std Residual -0.1 0.1 
Psychology 
Count 52 52 
Std Residual 0.2 0.2 
Counseling 
Count 19 19 
Std Residual 0.1 -0.1 
Nursing 
Count 4 6 
Std Residual -0.4 0.4 
Psychiatry 
Count 4 4 
Std Residual 0.0 0.0 
Chi-square(4, N=366) = 400, p = 0.98 
 
 
Table D.5 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups 
on Education Level 
  Group Assignment 
  Teacher Veteran 
Bachelors 
Count 2 7 
Std Residual -1.1 1.1 
Masters 
Count 122 133 
Std Residual -0.2 0.2 
Doctoral 
Count 55 47 
Std Residual 0.7 -0.7 
Chi-square(2, N=366) = 3.70, p = 0.16 
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Table D.6 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups 
on Theoretical Orientation 
  Group Assignment 
  Teacher Veteran 
Cognitive-Behavioral 
Count 81 84 
Std Residual 0.0 0.0 
Eclectic 
Count 23 35 
Std Residual -1.0 1.0 
Humanistic / Person Centered 
Count 19 24 
Std Residual -0.4 0.4 
Psychodynamic 
Count 14 15 
Std Residual 0.0 0.0 
No primary orientation 
Count 21 26 
Std Residual -0.4 0.4 
Other 
Count 21 3 
Std Residual 2.7 -2.6 
Chi-square(5, N=366) = 17.02, p = 0.004 
 
Table D.7 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups 
on Primary Practice Setting 
  Group Assignment 
  Teacher Veteran 
Individual or Group Private Practice 
Count 46 41 
Std Residual 0.5 -0.5 
Non-Gov Healthcare System, Inpatient or 
Outpatient 
Count 35 28 
Std Residual 0.8 -0.7 
City, County or State MH Services 
Count 19 14 
Std Residual 0.7 -0.7 
Federal Agency (VA, DoD, BIA, etc) 
Count 26 33 
Std Residual -0.5 0.5 
Non-Profit Organization 
Count 35 37 
Std Residual 0.0 0.0 
School (through 12th grade) 
Count 4 9 
Std Residual -0.9 0.9 
College or University Counseling Center 
Count 2 7 
Std Residual -1.1 1.1 
Other 
Count 12 18 
Std Residual -0.7 0.7 
Chi-square(7, N=366) = 8.44, p = 0.30 
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Table D.8 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups 
on Specialized Practice Experience with Populations 
   Group Assignment 
   Teacher Veteran 
Child/Adolescents 
 
No Count 86 88 
 Std Residual 0.1 -0.1 
Yes Count 93 99 
 Std Residual -0.1 0.1 
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.04, p = 0.85 
College Students 
 
No Count 112 138 
 Std Residual -0.9 0.9 
Yes Count 67 49 
 Std Residual 1.4 -1.3 
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.53, p = 0.02 
Families/Couples 
 
No Count 95 113 
 Std Residual -0.7 0.7 
Yes Count 84 74 
 Std Residual 0.8 -0.7 
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 2.02, p = 0.16 
Gerontology 
 
No Count 146 154 
 Std Residual -0.1 0.1 
Yes Count 33 33 
 Std Residual 0.1 -0.1 
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.04, p = .84 
LGBTQ 
 
No Count 132 149 
 Std Residual -0.5 0.5 
Yes Count 47 38 
 Std Residual 0.8 -0.8 
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 1.81, p = 0.18 
Veterans/Military 
 
No Count 115 126 
 Std Residual -0.3 0.3 
Yes Count 64 61 
 Std Residual 0.4 -0.4 
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.40, p = 0.53 
Women 
 
No Count 85 109 
 Std Residual -1.0 1.0 
Yes Count 94 78 
 Std Residual 1.1 -1.1 
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 4.29, p = 0.04 
Other 
 
No Count 146 162 
 Std Residual -0.4 0.4 
Yes Count 33 25 
Crystal Shelton 
92 
 
 Std Residual 0.9 -0.9 
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 1.76, p = 0.19 
 
Table D.9 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups 
on Specialized Practice Experience with Disorders 
   Group Assignment  
   Teacher Veteran 
Affective Disorder 
 
No Count 83 96 
 Std Residual -0.5 0.5 
Yes Count 96 91 
 Std Residual 0.5 -0.5 
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.90, p = 0.34 
Compulsive and Addictive Behaviors 
 
No Count 126 136 
 Std Residual -0.2 0.2 
Yes Count 53 51 
 Std Residual 0.3 -0.3 
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.25, p = 0.62 
Eating Disorders 
 
No Count 160 173 
 Std Residual -0.2 0.2 
Yes Count 19 14 
 Std Residual 0.7 -0.7 
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 1.09, p = 0.30 
Health Psychology 
 
No Count 146 146 
 Std Residual 0.3 -0.3 
Yes Count 33 41 
 Std Residual -0.5 0.5 
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.69, p = 0.41 
Serious and Persistent Mental Illness 
 
No Count 86 89 
 Std Residual 0.0 0.0 
Yes Count 93 98 
 Std Residual 0.0 0.0 
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.007, p = 0.93 
Personality Disorders 
 
No Count 101 113 
 Std Residual -0.4 0.4 
Yes Count 78 74 
 Std Residual 0.4 -0.4 
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.60, p = 0.44 
Substance Abuse 
 
No Count 104 110 
 Std Residual -0.9 0.8 
Yes Count 75 77 
 Std Residual 0.1 -0.1 
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.02, p = 0.89 
Trauma 
 
No Count 42 56 
 Std Residual -0.9 0.8 
Yes Count 137 131 
 Std Residual 0.5 -0.5 
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Chi-square(1, N=366) = 1.96, p = 0.16 
Other 
 
No Count 159 167 
 Std Residual 0.0 0.0 
Yes Count 20 20 
 Std Residual 0.1 -0.1 
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.02, p = .88 
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Table E.1 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups 
on Selecting PTSD as the Primary Diagnosis by Licensure Status 
   Group Assignment 
License Held Diagnosis  Teacher Veteran 
Fully Licensed 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 48 30 
Std Residual 1.7 -1.6 
Bipolor I Disorder 
Count 2 0 
Std Residual 1.1 -1.0 
Bipolar II Disorder 
Count 3 1 
Std Residual 0.8 -0.7 
Borderline Personality  
Disorder 
Count 2 4 
Std Residual -0.5 0.5 
Major Depressive  
Disorder 
Count 51 29 
Std Residual 2.0 -1.9 
Persistent Depressive  
Disorder 
Count 10 8 
Std Residual 0.5 -0.4 
PTSD 
Count 17 71 
Std Residual -3.9 3.8 
Chi-square(6, N=276) = 46.96, p = 0.00 
Unlicensed or  
Provisionally  
Licensed 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 16 14 
Std Residual 0.2 -0.2 
Bipolor I Disorder 
Count 1 0 
Std Residual 0.7 -0.7 
Bipolar II Disorder 
Count 1 1 
Std Residual 0.0 0.0 
Borderline Personality  
Disorder 
Count 2 0 
Std Residual 1.0 -1.0 
Major Depressive  
Disorder 
Count 15 13 
Std Residual 0.2 -0.2 
Persistent Depressive  
Disorder 
Count 6 3 
Std Residual 0.7 -0.7 
PTSD 
Count 5 13 
Std Residual -1.4 1.4 
Chi-square(6, N=90) = 7.8, p = 0.25 
Total Chi-square(6, N=366) = 49.73, p = 0.00 
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Table E.2 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups 
on Selecting PTSD as the Primary Diagnosis by DSM Training 
   Group Assignment 
Training Diagnosis  Teacher Veteran 
DSM-IV 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 26 13 
Std Residual 1.6 -1.5 
Bipolar II Disorder 
Count 1 0 
Std Residual 0.7 -0.7 
Borderline Personality  
Disorder 
Count 1 2 
Std Residual -0.4 0.4 
Major Depressive  
Disorder 
Count 23 16 
Std Residual 0.9 -0.9 
Persistent Depressive  
Disorder 
Count 5 3 
Std Residual 0.5 -0.5 
PTSD 
Count 6 30 
Std Residual -2.8 2.7 
Chi-square(5, N=126) = 23.40, p = 0.00 
DSM-5 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 16 11 
Std Residual 0.8 -0.8 
Bipolar II Disorder 
Count 1 2 
Std Residual -0.4 0.4 
Borderline Personality  
Disorder 
Count 2 0 
Std Residual 1.0 -1.0 
Major Depressive 
Disorder 
Count 14 13 
Std Residual 0.2 -0.2 
Persistent Depressive 
Disorder 
Count 4 4 
Std Residual 0.0 0.0 
PTSD 
Count 5 14 
Std Residual -1.4 1.4 
Chi-square(5, N=86) = 7.52, p = 0.19 
Both DSM-IV  
and DSM-5 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 19 15 
Std Residual 0.3 -0.3 
Biploar I Disorder 
Count 3 0 
Std Residual 1.1 -1.2 
Bipolar II Disorder 
Count 2 0 
Std Residual 0.9 -1.0 
Borderline Personality 
Disorder 
Count 1 2 
Std Residual -0.5 0.5 
Major Depressive 
Disorder 
Count 26 11 
Std Residual 1.5 -1.6 
Persistent Depressive 
Disorder 
Count 6 4 
Std Residual 0.3 -0.4 
PTSD 
Count 10 29 
Std Residual -2.3 2.4 
Chi-square(6, N=128) = 21.31, p = 0.002 
Neither or DSM-3 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 3 5 
Std Residual 0.3 -0.2 
Major Depressive  
Disorder 
Count 3 2 
Std Residual 1.2 -0.8 
Persistent Depressive 
Disorder 
Count 1 0 
Std Residual 1.2 -0.8 
PTSD 
Count 1 11 
Std Residual -1.4 0.9 
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Chi-square(3, N=26) = 7.26, p = 0.064 
Total Chi-square(6, N=366) = 49.74, p = 0.00 
Table E.3 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups 
on Selecting PTSD as the Primary Diagnosis by Field of Highest Degree Earned 
   Group Assignment 
Field Diagnosis  Teacher Veteran 
Social Work 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 37 25 
Std Residual 1.3 -1.2 
Bipolar I Disorder 
Count 2 0 
Std Residual 1.0 -1.0 
Bipolar II Disorder 
Count 4 1 
Std Residual 1.0 -1.0 
Borderline Personality  
Disorder 
Count 3 1 
Std Residual 0.8 -0.7 
Major Depressive  
Disorder 
Count 33 23 
Std Residual 1.1 -1.1 
Persistent Depressive  
Disorder 
Count 11 7 
Std Residual 0.8 -0.7 
PTSD 
Count 10 49 
Std Residual -3.5 3.4 
Chi-square(6, N=206) = 35.43, p = 0.00 
Psychology 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 15 13 
Std Residual 0.3 -0.3 
Bipolar I Disorder 
Count 1 0 
Std Residual 0.7 -0.7 
Borderline Personality  
Disorder 
Count 1 2 
Std Residual -0.4 0.4 
Major Depressive 
Disorder 
Count 24 9 
Std Residual 1.8 -1.8 
Persistent Depressive 
Disorder 
Count 3 2 
Std Residual 0.3 -0.3 
PTSD 
Count 8 26 
Std Residual -2.2 2.2 
Chi-square(5, N=104) = 18.0, p = 0.003 
Counseling 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 10 4 
Std Residual 1.1 -1.1 
Borderline Personality 
Disorder 
Count 0 1 
Std Residual -0.7 0.7 
Major Depressive 
Disorder 
Count 5 8 
Std Residual -0.6 0.6 
Persistent Depressive 
Disorder 
Count 2 2 
Std Residual 0.0 0.0 
PTSD 
Count 2 4 
Std Residual -0.6 0.6 
Chi-square(4, N=38) = 4.93, p = 0.23 
Nursing 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 1 1 
Std Residual 0.2 -0.2 
Bipolar II Disorder 
Count 0 1 
Std Residual -0.6 0.5 
Major Depressive 
Disorder 
Count 3 1 
Std Residual 1.1 -0.9 
PTSD 
Count 0 3 
Std Residual -1.1 0.9 
Chi-square(3, N=10) = 4.8, p = 0.19 
Psychiatry 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 1 1 
Std Residual 0.0 0.0 
Major Depressive 
Disorder 
Count 1 1 
Std Residual 0.0 0.0 
PTSD Count 2 2 
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Std Residual 0.0 0.0 
Chi-square(3, N=8) all cells have less than minimum expected count 
Total Chi-square(6, N=366) = 49.73, p = 0.00 
 
Table E.4 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups 
on Selecting PTSD as the Primary Diagnosis by Highest Educational Degree Earned 
   Group Assignment 
Education Level Diagnosis  Teacher Veteran 
Bachelors 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 1 4 
Std Residual -0.1 0.1 
PTSD 
Count 1 3 
Std Residual 0.1 -0.1 
Chi-square(1, N=9) = 0.32, p = 0.86 
Masters 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 48 30 
Std Residual 1.7 -1.7 
Bipolor I Disorder 
Count 2 0 
Std Residual 1.1 -1.0 
Bipolar II Disorder 
Count 4 1 
Std Residual 1.0 -1.0 
Borderline Personality  
Disorder 
Count 3 2 
Std Residual 0.4 -0.4 
Major Depressive  
Disorder 
Count 42 34 
Std Residual 0.9 -0.9 
Persistent Depressive  
Disorder 
Count 12 9 
Std Residual 0.6 -0.6 
PTSD 
Count 11 57 
Std Residual -3.8 3.6 
Chi-square(6, N=255) = 40.14, p = 0.00 
Doctoral 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 15 10 
Std Residual 0.4 -0.4 
Bipolor I Disorder 
Count 1 0 
Std Residual 0.6 -0.7 
Bipolar II Disorder 
Count 0 1 
Std Residual -0.7 0.8 
Borderline Personality  
Disorder 
Count 1 2 
Std Residual -0.5 0.5 
Major Depressive  
Disorder 
Count 24 8 
Std Residual 1.6 -1.8 
Persistent Depressive  
Disorder 
Count 4 2 
Std Residual 0.4 -0.5 
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PTSD 
Count 10 24 
Std Residual -1.9 2.1 
Chi-square(6, N=102) = 17.24, p = 0.008 
Total Chi-square(6, N=366) = 49.73, p = 0.00 
 
Table E.5 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups 
on Selecting PTSD as the Primary Diagnosis by Theoretical Orientation 
   Group Assignment 
Theoretical Orientation Diagnosis  Teacher Veteran 
Cognitive-Behavioral 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 30 17 
Std Residual 1.4 -1.4 
Bipolar I Disorder 
Count 1 0 
Std Residual 0.7 -0.7 
Bipolar II Disorder 
Count 2 0 
Std Residual 1.0 -1.0 
Borderline Personality  
Disorder 
Count 2 2 
Std Residual 0.0 0.0 
Major Depressive  
Disorder 
Count 32 18 
Std Residual 1.5 -1.5 
Persistent Depressive  
Disorder 
Count 6 4 
Std Residual 0.5 -0.5 
PTSD 
Count 8 43 
Std Residual -3.4 3.3 
Chi-square(6, N=165) = 34.89, p = 0.00 
Eclectic 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 8 7 
Std Residual 0.8 -0.7 
Borderline Personality  
Disorder 
Count 0 2 
Std Residual -0.9 0.7 
Major Depressive 
Disorder 
Count 11 6 
Std Residual 1.6 -1.3 
Persistent Depressive 
Disorder 
Count 2 1 
Std Residual 0.7 -0.6 
PTSD 
Count 2 19 
Std Residual -2.2 1.8 
Chi-square(4, N=58) = 15.83, p = 0.003 
Humanistic / Person  
Centered 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 6 9 
Std Residual 1.1 -1.1 
Bipolar II Disorder 
Count 0 1 
Std Residual -0.7 0.6 
Borderline Personality 
Disorder 
Count 1 0 
Std Residual 0.8 -0.7 
Major Depressive 
Disorder 
Count 6 4 
Std Residual 0.8 -0.7 
Persistent Depressive 
Disorder 
Count 2 2 
Std Residual 0.2 -0.2 
PTSD 
Count 4 8 
Std Residual -0.6 0.5 
Chi-square(5, N=43) = 3.8, p = 0.58 
Psychodynamic 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 6 5 
Std Residual 0.3 -0.3 
Bipolar I Disorder 
Count 1 0 
Std Residual 0.7 -0.7 
Major Depressive 
Disorder 
Count 5 4 
Std Residual 0.3 -0.3 
PTSD 
Count 2 6 
Std Residual -0.9 0.9 
Chi-square(3, N=29) = 3.17, p = 0.37 
No Primary Orientation 
Anxiety Disorder 
Count 7 6 
Std Residual 0.5 -0.4 
Bipolar I Disorder 
Count 1 0 
Std Residual 0.8 -0.7 
Bipolar II Disorder 
Count 0 1 
Std Residual -0.7 0.6 
Borderline Personality 
Disorder 
Count 1 0 
Std Residual 0.8 -0.7 
Major Depressive Count 1 1 
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Disorder Std Residual 0.0 0.0 
Persistent Depressive 
Disorder 
Count 4 3 
Std Residual 0.5 -0.4 
PTSD 
Count 2 6 
Std Residual -0.8 0.7 
Chi-square(6, N=47) = 6.95, p = 0.33 
Total Chi-square(6, N=366) = 49.73, p = 0.00 
 
